

GRAECIA LIBERATA AND THE ROLE OF FLAMININUS IN LIVY'S FOURTH DECADE*

EDWIN M. CARAWAN
Southwest Missouri State University

T. Quinctius Flaminius, the “Liberator” of Hellas in the Second Macedonian War, is the leading figure of Livy’s seventh pentad, and his policy is one of the underlying issues of the pentekaidekad, to the end of the Third Macedonian War in book 45.¹ The characterization of Flaminius, for which much of the material in Polybius survives, has been a focus of work on Livy’s aims and methods since Nissen’s *Kritische Untersuchungen*. The analysis of Livy’s work as a haphazard compilation has been happily abandoned, but it is still generally assumed that Polybius was hostile to Flaminius, and Livy has done what he could to make his protagonist a more Augustan hero through “patriotic” revision.² In recent studies, T. J. Luce has presented a convincing case for

* The following will be referred to by author’s name and short title: J. Briscoe, *Commentary on Livy Books XXXI–XXXIII* (Oxford 1973) A. Klotz, “Die Quellen Plutarchs in der Lebensbeschreibung des T. Quinctius Flaminius,” *RhM* 84 (1935) 46–53; T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of his History* (Princeton 1977); H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin 1863); H. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* (Basel 1977); P. G. Walsh, *Livy: his Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge 1961); K. Witte, “Ueber die Form der Darstellung in Livius’ Geschichtswerk,” *RhM* 65 (1910) 270–305, 359–419.

¹ For the career of Flaminius see H. Gundel in *RE* 24 (1963) 1047–1100 (on the Macedonian campaign, 1052–76); for a list of the ancient sources, T. R. S. Broughton *MRR* 1:330, 334, 336; and, on the early career of Flaminius, Ernst Badian in *JRS* 61 (1971) 102–11. Badian has also given a very interesting history of scholarship on Flaminius in “Titus Quinctius Flaminius, Philhellenism and Realpolitik” *Cincinnati Cl. St.* 2 (Semple Lecture for 1970) 273–327. For the themes and issues that unify the pentekaidekad, Books 31–45, see, most recently, E. Burck, “Die römische Expansion im Urteil des Livius” *ANRW* II 30.2 (1982) 1148–89.

² For the conclusions of *Quellenforschung*, see Nissen, *KU* esp. 52–109, and 139–50, on the events of 198–6; A. Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* (Stuttgart 1940) 5–35. For the supposed prejudice of Polybius and Livy’s characterization, see John Briscoe in *Latomus* 31 (1972) 22–53; and *Comm.* 22–47; Briscoe acknowledges (*Comm.* 7–8) “It also seems quite likely that the alterations in connection with Flaminius stem from the different picture of him painted by the annalists,” but that influence has not been thoroughly investigated. The prevailing view, that Polybius presents an accurate indictment, is based upon the arguments of M. Holleaux, *Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecques* V (Paris 1957) 29–79 (= *REG* 36 [1923] 115–71). In defense of Flaminius, see J. P. V.

Livy's artful divergence from Polybius, and H. Tränkle has defended the conservative spirit of Livy's adaptation. The "idealized" figure of Flamininus emerges as a creature of thematic development and dramatic *enargeia*, rather than a product of conflation.³ It is sometimes suggested that the Latin annalists influenced Livy's handling of certain scenes from the Greek historian, but no profile has been drawn of the character that Livy found in the *Annales* of Claudius Quadrigarius and Valerius Antias. It is often assumed that the Latin authors were favorable to the Roman hero, although Cato, whose influence is extensive, probably presented no flattering account of his rival. These uncertainties cast a shadow of doubt over much that has been written on Livy's artistry. It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to reconstruct the Latin tradition and reassess Livy's revisionism in the characterization of the Liberator.

"Patriotic" alterations are clearly evident in four sections: the negotiations with Philip in book 32; the settlement of Greek affairs after Kynoskephalai in 33; the death of Hannibal in book 39; and the intrigue with Philip's son Demetrius, leading to his assassination in 40. In these episodes and the adjoining narrative, Livy frequently refers to variants in his Latin sources, and other annalistic features can be reconstructed from discrepancies in Livy's account and the later tradition. The question has not been seriously considered, however, to what extent Livy's treatment bears the imprint of the annalistic version. Luce rejects out of hand the notion that Livy tried to piece together disparate accounts (144), to compose a version "essentially of his own making," "vouched for by nobody." "The fraud," he argues, "would be apparent to those who cared to go back to read earlier writers." But if we follow the outline of Livy's working methods that Luce himself has given and that has won wide acceptance, it is reasonable to suppose that annalistic perspectives were imposed upon the Polybian material: in the arrangement of episodes, the annalistic framework sometimes altered the order of events; and in the adaptation of scenes and speeches, as Livy worked section by section, largely from memory, inevitably annalistic details intruded. The product of this procedure is not the kind of compilation that Nissen supposed, nor is it an unsubstantiated fiction that Livy would have regarded as, indeed, "irresponsible"; but conflation, nonetheless, is sometimes all too apparent from what we can read and reconstruct in the earlier authors.

D. Balsdon in *Phoenix* 21 (1967) 177-90.

³ The influence of Witte, "Ueber die Form der Darstellung", is everywhere evident, and his discussions of *Einzelerszählungen* will be noted *passim*. Tränkle's approach in *Livius und Polybios* owes as much to Witte as to Nissen; see 65-71 on Livy's efforts to resolve discrepancies; and 144-50, and 162-64 on possible influence of the annalists in the "idealization" of Flamininus. See Luce, *Livy* 33-74, on the structure of books 31-35; and 139-84, on Livy's approach to his sources (esp. 144, discounting conflation). See also Walsh, *Livy*, esp. 205-6 and 209-12. An ambitious study of Livy's editorial methods in the seventh pentad was offered by H. Brueggman, *Komposition und Entwicklungstendenzen der Bücher 31-35 des T. Livius* (Diss. Kiel 1955). On the influence of Cato, cf. H. Tränkle, "Cato in der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius" in *Abh. Ak. Wiss. Lit. Mainz* 4 (1971) 111-37; Nissen *KU* 154-55.

For the early career of Flamininus and the events leading up to his consulship, discrepancies concerning his qualifications are immediately evident in Livy's sources. Undoubtedly his extraordinary advancement to the consulship at thirty years of age was the subject of editorializing by the annalists, but we are given surprisingly little information in Livy. Concerning Flamininus' propraetorian command at Tarentum (in his early twenties, 205–202), we are told practically nothing. Regarding his administrative duties after the Second Punic War, Livy reports that he was chosen *decemvir* for Samnium and Apulia (in the south near his area of service) and later appointed to serve concurrently as *triumvir* to administer Venusia (31.4.3; 49.6). According to the parallel account in Plutarch (*Flam.* 1.4), however, Flamininus was assigned to the colonies at Narnia and Cosa (to the north of Rome), and that discrepancy probably indicates confusion in the Latin annalistic tradition. Moreover, the *mss.* at Liv. 31.4.5 name T. Quinctius Flamininus as aedile for 201, in contradiction to the prevailing tradition that he advanced to the consulship in 198 *ex quaestura* (32.7.9–10). The *praenomen* is now generally dismissed as a corrupt reading for L. Quinctius, the brother of Titus, but we should be wary of assuming errors of the scribe to correct the failings of the historian. Such inconsistencies in Livy's account are not unparalleled; the manuscript tradition is unanimous; emendation is unwarranted. Given the confusion in the annalistic tradition on Flamininus' early career, it has been convincingly argued, to the contrary, that this contradiction on his previous offices arises from conflicting accounts in the *Annales* of Claudius and Valerius.⁴

Regarding the consular elections for 198, the correspondence between Livy's account and Plutarch's note (*Flam.* 2) led Klotz to conclude that both versions derive from Valerius Antias, and in this instance he is generally followed.⁵ It is also likely that Livy corrected Valerius in regard to the legality

⁴ These discrepancies are discussed by Nissen *KU* 133–34. (without emendation); Klotz, *Livius* 96, notes that the earlier entry probably derives from *Annales Maximi*, the later, from Valerius Antias; more recently, G. V. Sumner, reviewing Briscoe *Comm.* in *AJP* 96 (1975) 322, argues, "This type of notice [31.4.5]...is certainly documentary in origin, deriving perhaps from pontifical records...The passage in 32.7 is a piece of annalistic composition after the manner of Valerius Antias (Plutarch *Titus* 2.1 has a garbled echo of it)." Sumner goes on to observe parenthetically that "it is not impossible for Titus to have been aedile 201, quaestor 200 or 199, and consul 198, though it does not seem probable." For other paleographical solutions to historiographical problems, see below, at notes 34, 50, and 56. On Flamininus' early offices see Badian in *JRS* 61 (1971) 109–10; followed, in general, by A. M. Eckstein, *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 119–21. For Plutarch's use of Valerius Antias alongside Polybius, in this and other sections of the *Vit. Flam.*, see H. Peter, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographien der Römer* (1865, repr. Amsterdam 1965) 80–85; Klotz, "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 46–53; and Nissen *KU* 290–92. For Plutarch's methods, see the studies by C. B. R. Pelling (on the later Roman lives) in *JHS* 99 (1979) 74–96; and *JHS* 100 (1980) 127–40.

⁵ Cf. Nissen *KU* 290, and Klotz in "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 49–50: Livy and Plutarch (independently) turn to Polybius for the campaign of 198, though both continued to consult Valerius (see note 6 below). Against Klotz' reconstruction of

of the election. Plutarch, presumably following Valerius, reports that tribunes opposed the nomination, claiming it would be illegal, *παρὰ τοὺς νόμους*, for so young a man to advance to the consulship without having served as aedile or praetor. Such advancement was only made illegal, however, by the *lex Villia annalis* of 180, and Klotz supposed that Valerius was responsible for the anachronism. Livy makes it clear that there was nothing strictly illegal in Flaminius' election (32.7.10-11); it was opposed as an undemocratic precedent, though not unparalleled, *nec per honorum gradus, documentum sui dantes nobiles homines tendere ad consulatum*. The Senate, however, decreed that the people should have the authority to elect any qualified candidate, *qui honorem quem sibi capere per leges liceret peteret*. Thus the scenario probably derives from Valerius, and the last phrase is likely to be Livy's clarification.

Livy also notes that Valerius was at odds with the other sources on events in Macedon leading to Flaminius' command. At year's end 199, as Livy turned from *res Graeciae* in Polybius to the annalists for affairs at Rome, he found that Valerius reported a decisive victory for Flaminius' predecessor, Villius, where his other sources agreed nothing of note had been accomplished. Thus from the outset, we are advised that Valerius gave a very different account of Flaminius' consulship.⁶

The Campaign of 198 and the Doctrine of Liberation

For the campaign of 198, the Polybian version can be reconstructed from Plut. *Flam.* 3-5, App. *Mac.* 5, and Diod. 28.11; these accounts suggest a striking discrepancy concerning official policy and the young consul's strategy. Appian and Diodorus agree that Flaminius, in the first negotiations with Philip at the Aous, demanded complete withdrawal from the occupied states.

Antias in Plut., R. E. Smith argued for a "biographical" source, in *CQ* 34 (1940) 1-10 and 38 (1944) 89-95, but his view is generally discounted. Val. Ant. appears to be Livy's chief source for party politics in this era, though here as elsewhere Livy alters the Valerian version (see below, note 55); the chronology followed by Val. Ant. *apud* Liv. 32.6.5-8 is clearly linked to the debate 32.28.4-7 (below, note 14). On the constitutional issue, see Briscoe's *Comm.* p. 180. Eckstein (above, note 4) 123-26, on Flaminius' advancement to the consulship and command against Macedon, takes the surprising view that he was "a young man with few special qualifications" who was assigned his task in Greece by honest sortition.

⁶ Liv. 32.6.5-8:

Valerius Antias intrasse saltum Villium tradit...(6) ponte raptim facto in ripam, in qua erant castra regia, transgressum acie conflixisse; fusum fugatumque regem, castris exutum; duodecim milia...caesa...aedem etiam Iovi in eo proelio votam...ceteri Graeci Latinique auctores, quorum quidem ego legi annales nihil memorabile a Villio actum integrumque bellum insequentem consulem T. Quintium accepisse tradunt.

The exploits of Villius were amplified in Valerius, and by contrast, Flaminius' success was diminished.

Diodorus, who gives the fullest account of this debate, has Flamininus claim Senate authority for this ultimatum, διότι παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἐντολὰς ἔχει ταύτας ὅπως μὴ μέρος τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἐλευθεροῦν, to which Philip responds “what more would you demand, had you conquered?”⁷ In Livy’s account the Roman demands are not so unequivocally stated, and there is no claim of a senatorial mandate for “total withdrawal.” Flamininus seems to acknowledge that some areas of occupied territory may be negotiable, since some states are given priority, “first among them Thessaly.” Thessaly, of course, is one of the “ancestral possessions” (from Philip’s position, non-negotiable) and, in Livy’s version, it is to this demand that the king responds, *Quid victo gravius imperares?* (10.7). These discrepancies are often dismissed by one explanation or another; it is sometimes assumed that Livy gives the more faithful version of Polybius, where Diodorus and Appian reveal later annalistic revision.⁸ The balance of the evidence, however, tends to the opposite conclusion. Livy’s account bears the influence of the annalistic source who portrayed Flamininus in his first campaign as an indecisive and ineffectual figure. From the annalistic source Livy reports that Flamininus delayed forty days without taking the initiative (32.9.8–10.1). This delay is linked to the Valerian chronology at Liv. 32.28.4–7 (cf. notes 6 and 14), and it is entirely inconsistent with the chronology and the characterization, marked by initiative and decisive action, in the Polybian tradition.⁹

It is evident that the causes of the war, Senatorial policy and the Liberation doctrine were treated with a legalistic concern for the *Kriegsschuldfrage* in the *Annales*.¹⁰ Despite the Polybian tradition that the Romans demanded “total

⁷ Cf. Appian *Mac.* 5... συναγόντων αὐτοὺς Ἡπειρωτῶν πρέσβεων. ὥς δὲ ὁ Φλαμινίνος Φίλιππον ἐκέλευσεν ἐκστῆναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀλλὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν αὐταῖς. Walsh, (above, note 2) 210–11, observed the discrepancy between Livy and Diodorus, but suggested that the demand to liberate Thessaly, and “the more forceful expression of Philip’s anger” that it provoked, “are imaginative details supplied by Livy himself.”

⁸ For the view that Livy gives the more accurate version of Pol., and discrepancies in Diod. and App. derive from the annalistic tradition, cf. M. L. Heidemann, *Die Freiheitssparole in der griechisch-römischen Auseinandersetzung (200–188 v. Chr.)* (Bonn 1966) 105 note 2; R. Seager, *CQ* 31 (1981) 108. Eckstein (above, note 4) p. 129, minimizes the discrepancy.

⁹ Plut. *Flam.* 1.2 φιλοτιμώτατος δὲ καὶ φιλοδοξώτατος ὢν ἐβούλετο τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ μεγίστων πράξεων αὐτουργὸς εἶναι. cf. Nissen *KU* 290. The Polybian version in Plut. *Flam.* 4 portrays the young commander as a much more decisive figure. It should also be noted that the victory at the Aous, opening up all of north central Greece, was a much more significant success than Livy suggests; cf. N. G. L. Hammond in *JRS* 56 (1966) 42–53.

¹⁰ K.-E. Petzold, *Die Eröffnung des Zweiten Römisch-Makedonischen Krieges* (Berlin 1940), gives a convincing outline of the annalistic treatment (see Larsen’s review in *CP* 38 [1943] 58–60), focusing on the *Kriegsschuldfrage*. His analysis is occasionally flawed by the assumption that discrepancies in Livy, follow earlier annalistic reworking of Polybius, as though Livy exercises no editorial discretion (e.g. pp. 61, 66, 91, and esp. 105–6) His reconstruction of the propaganda regarding Philip’s provocations (e.g. the imaginary *Macedonum*

withdrawal" from the outset of the war, in Livy's account, Roman policy evolved from the *Fides*-propaganda of the late third century; the Liberation Doctrine developed in the course of the campaigns of 198-7; and, in formulating policy, Flamininus was guided by the allies. The claim that the Romans had come to liberate the Hellenes, without territorial ambitions, is first announced by Aristaeus at the Achaean Conference (32.21.36), in a passage that anticipates the declaration of liberty at the Isthmus: *Sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicarent...mare traiecerunt* (cf. 33.33.4-5...*suo labore ac periculo bella gerat pro libertate aliorum nec hoc finitimis...sed maria traiciat*). And in the debate at Nicaea, in Livy's account, as we shall see, it is the allies who demand total withdrawal; Flamininus is more willing to negotiate.

The Achaean alliance that gave legitimacy to Roman intervention was evidently treated in the annalistic version as the fateful and unforeseen turn of events that inspired the Liberation Doctrine. As Flamininus was besieging Elatia he learned that Philip's most prominent supporter among the Achaeans had been deposed and there was an opportunity to win their allegiance to Rome. Livy introduces the scene with insight into the mind of his protagonist, *consuli rei maioris spes adfulsit* (19.1). Flamininus' eagerness to take the diplomatic initiative is all the more vivid after the frustrations of that first year, when his initial success at the Aous had led to a prolonged campaign of siege-warfare.¹¹

In the record of the Achaean conference at Sikyon there are several discrepancies which indicate a conflict between Polybius and the later tradition. Livy developed the drama and historical significance of the Achaean debate at length (19-23.3). The Roman alliance is at last favorably received, though formal ratification must be deferred. At the close of the summer of 198, it is the first promise of the victory to come. Appian, on the other hand, gives a much more pessimistic account: the majority of the delegates were opposed to the

legio at Zama, Philip's plot to invade Italy), directly linked to the treatment of fetial law from the annalistic tradition is especially useful; see esp. pp. 51-76; cf. McDonald and Walbank, *JRS* 27 (1937) 180-207. For the development of Roman policy, from *Fides*-propaganda to the Liberation Doctrine, see Heidemann (above, note 8) 21-36, against the views of Homo, Aymard, *inter al.*, that Roman policy was fixed at the time of the ultimatum and *indictio* in 200, or at the time of Flamininus' appointment, and thereafter unchanged (p. 32 and notes 6-7). Cf. E. Badian, *Foreign Clientela* (Oxford 1958) 55-77, "...the new policy arose out of the lessons learnt in the course of the war" (71); E. S. Gruen, in *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley 1984) 145-46, "There can be little doubt that the Isthmian declaration of 196 is the product of Greek formulation."

¹¹ The frustration of the first year is indicated e.g. at the siege of Atrax, 32.17.4-5: after the Romans were repulsed, *Id consul aegre passus nec eam ignominiam ad unius modo oppugnandae moram urbis sed ad summam universi belli pertinere ratus, quod ex momentis parvarum plerumque rerum penderet* (9). See Walsh, *Livy* 169, on Livy's portrayal of the commander's state of mind before action; cf. 32.18.1, *consul minime aequo animo comparisonem militum...patiebatur, simul nec maturam expugnandi spem*. This episode contributes to an image of Flamininus as ill-prepared for his later test of tactics at the Aous.

Roman alliance, as they recalled the atrocities of Sulpicius Galba (*Mac.* 7; in this assessment of Achaean sentiment, Pausanias agrees, 7.8.2). When the advocates of the Roman alliance, led by Aristaenus, appeared to carry the motion for a vote, many of those opposed walked out of the assembly; and the decree was thus passed virtually by default of the opposition, rather than by sincere consensus, as the Romans would have wished. It has been usually assumed that Appian's account more accurately represents Polybius, and Livy's account, again, bears the mark of "patriotic" revisions—although Aymard argued, to the contrary, that Appian's account cannot derive from Polybius!¹² Appian elsewhere reveals his prejudice against Flamininus, and, against Aymard's view, it is more likely that he has here simplified the parliamentary maneuvers to the discredit of Flamininus' supporters. Livy's version, however, strikes a note of disagreement with the direct testimony of Polybius, 18.13.8, "the Achaean nation would have been utterly destroyed, had not Aristaenus turned their allegiance to Rome at this crisis." That phrase clearly implies that the speech of Aristaenus (which Livy develops at such length) was the decisive voice in Polybius' account of the debate; but Livy leaves the vote of the *damiurgi* deadlocked after Aristaenus' harangue, and it is only after the quarrel of Pisas and Memnon (father against son) that the latter changes his vote and the motion is carried. The intended significance of this anecdote in Livy's source is difficult to determine, but it seems at odds with Polybius' explicit statement that Aristaenus played the decisive role in this debate. Pisas' threat to murder his son (if he rejected the Roman alliance) seems more in accord with the violent tactics that forced the walkout in Appian *Mac.* 7; in Livy's version the abstentions are justified by honorable loyalty. The separate strands of tradition may be inextricable, as Aymard concedes; but we can reasonably conclude that Livy had before him two conflicting versions of the events—one in which Aristaenus' arguments carried the day, and another in which the motion was forced through, by intimidation and in defiance of a large body of the league's constituents (if not, as Appian insists, the majority).

Livy reports that the siege of Elatia at last succeeded when Flamininus promised liberty to the inhabitants (24.7), but on this point "Livy's veracity...is open to very serious challenge."¹³ In Livy and in Polybius it is

¹² Supposing App. follows Pol., Nissen, *KU* 138, suggests, "so mag Livius aus patriotischen Gründen die Nachricht vertuscht haben"; he notes (117), however, Appian's prejudice. L. Homo, "Flamininus et la politique romaine en Grèce (198–194)" *Rev. Hist.* 121 (1916) 298, accepts Appian's version as the more plausible. A. Aymard, *Les premiers Rapports de Rome et de la confédération achaienne* (Bordeaux 1938), 95–97, in a lengthy note, insists "Le texte d' Appien (*Mac.* 7)...ne paraît pas provenir de Polybe" (note 58); he is followed by Heidemann, *Die Freiheitsparole* (above, note 8) 33; and now by A. M. Eckstein, in *CQ* 37 (1987) 140–62. Eckstein concludes that the episode of Memnon "must have stood originally in Pol." (144 note 36) apparently assuming all things Greek in Livy derive from Polybius.

¹³ Briscoe, *Comm.* 214. There is inscriptional evidence, *SEG* 11.2 (1954) 1107 (περὶ τὰς Ἐλατέων καθόδου, 11), that the Elatians were expelled from their city and later restored by M'. Acilius Glabrio in 191. Briscoe concludes, "it is

clear that Flaminius continued to use Elatia as a base of operations throughout the campaign of 198/7. Presumably, Polybius reported that the Elatians were promised safe conduct, along with the Macedonian garrison, if they departed unarmed. Livy, evidently, derived his account of the "liberation" of Elatia from the Latin annalistic tradition, which, as we shall see, suggested a number of revisions in Livy's adaptation of Polybius: Flaminius has yet to proclaim the doctrine of "total withdrawal" as a bargaining position against Philip (as he has done in Polybius); at Elatia he first adopted the slogan of *libertas* as an expedient, to win the hearts and minds of the Greeks.

At this point, for the Macedonian campaign of 198, the most promising achievement that Flaminius has to his credit is the new Achaean alliance, as yet unratified. The siege of Corinth held little prospect of success, while Philip's general Philocles had stolen a march on Argos: *duae nobilissimae urbes, Argi et Corinthus, in potestate regis erant. Haec ea aestate ab Romanis in Graecia terra marique gesta* (25.11–12).

This unfavorable assessment is closely joined to the annalistic framework, and it is linked to the Valerian version by the debate on prorogation of Flaminius' command in 28.4–7, where the tribunes L. Oppius and Q. Fulvius insist "Villius was joining battle with the enemy but was recalled before he could bring the war to an end." Flaminius had been delayed for the greater part of the year by religious duties.¹⁴ The debate on prorogation is thus linked to the Valerian account of Villius' victory (32.6.5–8) and the annalistic intrusion, that the inexperienced commander delayed forty days without taking action (9.8–10.1). These claims contradict the Polybian version, according to which Villius accomplished nothing of note, and Flaminius relieved him of command early in the year. Livy has recast the divergent tradition in the speech of his characters. The chronology of Livy's source here, at 28.3–9, is also at odds with the account of negotiations at Nicaea, where we are told that Flaminius had not yet learned his command had been prorogued.

The debate at Nicaea is often cited as an excellent example either of Livy's artistry in adapting Polybius or of his own revisionism, but in the sequence of negotiations, from the Aous to the Senate hearing at Rome, there is a pattern of discrepancies linked to the annalistic tradition, regarding chronology, the motives and methods of Flaminius, and the role of the allies in shaping Roman policy. The negotiations at Nicaea must have come in late fall or early winter of 198; in Livy's account they are reported after the Gallic campaign of Minucius as consul in 197. The dramatic setting and sequence of the action (with Flaminius and the allies on shore, Philip aboard ship nearby) are clearly drawn directly from Polybius, but there are substantive changes affecting the characters of Flaminius and Philip.¹⁵ The Machiavellian motives of the

quite possible that the removal of the inhabitants of Elatia was described by Polybius and deliberately omitted by L. or one of his annalistic predecessors." Elatia is a base of operations at Liv. 32.39.2; 33.1.1; 3.6; 25.5; 31.7.

¹⁴ Liv. 32.28.5: *Villium congregientem cum hoste infecta re revocatum. Quinctium rebus divinis Romae maiorem partem anni retentum* ...cf. note 6 above.

¹⁵ On Livy's narrative technique in the Debate at Nicaea, see K. Witte "Ueber

Roman commander, who “reluctantly” agreed to negotiate because he was not yet sure of prorogation, are revealed with surprising candor (32.32.6–7), much as they must have appeared in the lost section of Polybius (before 18.1). In the transition from the siege of Opus to the negotiations at Nicaea, however, Livy supplies an additional explanation for Flaminius’ reluctance, which must derive from the Latin annalist: *mora cur non ex templo oppugnarentur* (32.5). In Polybius, the siege of Opus had already succeeded when the negotiations began.¹⁶

In both accounts Flaminius is measured against his adversary. In Polybius he succeeds in playing off the animosities of Philip and the allies to his own ends, whereas in Livy’s version the Roman commander seems caught in a diplomatic predicament. It is often observed that Livy’s alterations are meant to make the Roman hero morally superior, though he appears at a disadvantage in expertise. In Livy’s version the proper Augustan attitude toward Philip is made evident in the first two exchanges (32. 32.12–33.1; 34.2–3): Philip refuses to come ashore, and he insults his adversaries “with a haughty and imperious temper,” *superbo et regio animo*; and in his response to the Aetolian στρατηγός Phaeneas, Philip’s sarcasm is conduct unbecoming a king, *dicacior quam regem decet*. These appear to be Livy’s own comments. For Polybius, Philip’s sarcasm is native talent, and it is an effective argumentative tactic: when Phaeneas, whose eyes were failing with age, demanded that Philip must either prevail in battle or submit, Philip responded “Why, even a blind man can see that!” Polybius says, “he was gifted at ridicule,” (εὖ πεφυκὼς πρὸς τὸ διαχλευάζειν) and despite the appearance of an arrogant and impetuous personality (as Livy describes him), in Polybius’ account it is evident that Philip’s provocative tactics were calculated to disrupt the debate and force Flaminius to negotiate privately.¹⁷

In Livy’s account, Flaminius moves closer to the allies’ demand for “total withdrawal” but there is still a distinction in the language of the Roman demands and those of the Aetolians, a distinction that is clearly intended to recall the Roman’s willingness to negotiate at the Aous. Livy calls the Aetolian

die Form der Darstellung” 283–4; Walsh *Livy* 211–12.

¹⁶ The meaning of 32.32. 6, *gravate concessum*, is still disputed. The interpretation of A. H. McDonald (in the apparatus to his Oxford Text *ad loc.*) gives the most self-evident meaning; cf. Balsdon, in *Phoenix* 21 (1967), 180 note 12. The reason for Flaminius’ reluctance is indicated in the preceding line, *mora... non oppugnarentur* (32.5); the phrase *necdum sciebat utrum successor sibi...mitteretur* (7) is best taken with the preceding adversative clause (*non quin...cuperet*). Holleaux suggested (above, note 2), however, that this reluctance is pretended (32 note 1), and he is followed by Briscoe, (above, note 4) 27–28, and *Comm.* 228–29. On the chronology of the Polybian version, see below, at note 23.

¹⁷ For reasons Holleaux (above, note 2) 31–35. Such use of ridicule is a recognized rhetorical ploy (cf. Aristotle *Rhet.* 3.18.7, 1419b); but for Livy and his Augustan audience it is an inappropriate tactic; cf. Cic. *de Oratore* 2.44, 221, *...et dicacibus difficillimum habere hominum rationem et tempus*; 2.60, 246. See also Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* 47–48.

demand for total withdrawal (*ut Graecia decederetur*, 33.8) “nearly the same,” *eadem ferme quae Romani*. But Flamininus has stated the Roman position in slightly different terms: Philip must withdraw his garrisons from *all* occupied states (*deducenda ex omnibus Graeciae civitatibus regi praesidia*, 32.33.3). This phrasing clearly recalls his earlier position at the Aous, where he indicated that some occupied territories were negotiable; cf. 32.10.3,7 (*praesidia ex civitatibus rex deduceret...cum ageretur, quae civitates liberandae essent*). In negotiations of this kind, such distinctions are not insignificant: by referring to the withdrawal of garrisons from formerly sovereign states, viewed independently (*civitates*) rather than as a community (ἡ Ἑλλάς), Flamininus signals a willingness to negotiate on the status of some areas to which Philip may have a more valid claim, or where strategic considerations may make concessions more feasible. In both accounts, such an understanding seems to be the basis of the agreement reached in private negotiations on the third day of the conference.¹⁸ Livy thus gives a more open account of the Roman’s intent—that is not to say that he gives a more faithful version of his official position on that day. In Polybius the demand for total withdrawal has become a resounding slogan: there is no distinction between the Roman position and the Aetolian: κελεύειν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης ἐκχωρεῖν, 18.1.13; cf. 2.6, τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης ἐξίστασθαι; 9.1, τὸ κοινὸν ἐπίταγμα...ἀπάσης ἐκχωρεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. And there is no change from the position that Flamininus adopted at the Aous; cf. Diod. 28.11, and App. *Mac.* 5 (above, note 7). In this context, the language of Livy’s version has special meaning: a direct translation of Polybius appears for the Aetolian demands, *Graecia decederetur*; but Flamininus’ demand, *ex civitatibus...praesidia deducenda*, probably represents the phrasing of the annalistic version.

In Polybius, the demand for “total withdrawal” is an official slogan, which Flamininus, with cynical detachment, adopts as a bargaining position; his suspicion of Aetolian aims is clearly revealed in his amusement at Philip’s query, “Most of the Aetolians are not Greek at all; do you surrender them to me?” Livy’s character sees no humor in such remarks, and shows a greater deference to the allies’ concerns. In Polybius, Flamininus is negotiating from a position of strength (after victories at Elatia and Opus), but in Livy’s version the frustrations of his first campaign appear to have made his diplomatic initiative all the more urgent. By contrast to his earlier position, his demands now appear to be prompted by the allies, whereas in Polybius he is a more objective arbiter of their demands.¹⁹

¹⁸ M. Feyel, “T. Quinctius Flamininus, Philippe et les Achéens,” *REG* 56 (1943) 235–47, argued that Philip was willing to give up other disputed territory in order to hold Thessaly, and there is merit to his argument on this point; cf. Balsdon *Phoenix* 21 (1967) 184–85. Feyel assumes with Aymard that the Senate demanded “total withdrawal,” and he poses the hypothesis (241–43) that the demand for the “fetters” was Flamininus’ compromise.

¹⁹ Flamininus’ suspicion of Aetolian demands is further indicated in Pol. 18.4.8–5.2, where Philip refers to a law of the Aetolians allowing the cities of that federation to ally with either side in regional hostilities and plunder either side without decree of the Aetolian League. Flamininus asks for clarification,

At the end of the first day's debate, in Polybius, Philip asks for written statements from each of the allies to consider their demands in detail, since, he says with some irony, he has not brought so many counselors. Flaminius repays him in kind, "Of course you are alone: you have destroyed all your best advisers!" Polybius regarded this as a very effective retort, that reassured the allies and signaled to Philip that he understood his position. Philip smiled sardonically and kept quiet (18.7; cf. Liv. 32.35.1–2). Livy tells us none of this, neither that Philip asked for written statements, nor Flaminius' rejoinder. The next day Philip arrived too late for negotiations, and asked that he and Flaminius continue talks in private the following day at Thronion. In the private talks, Livy cautions that we know little of what Philip said; Polybius says we know only what Flaminius reported; in both accounts, Philip's proposal included terms that may have seemed unfavorable to the Aetolians and inadequate to the other allies. In the end the issue was submitted to the Senate, where Flaminius won the next round—or so Polybius leads us to believe; Livy gives quite a different impression.

At the conclusion of the debate at Nicaea (18.10.3), Polybius praises Flaminius' skill, "the outcome was much as he had expected and quite in accord with his original calculations," κατὰ νοὺν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλογισμοὺς; and he proceeded to weave the fabric of his strategy, giving Philip no advantage. Again, in his account of the Senate hearing (12.2), he insists "everything turned out as Titus intended," πάντα κατὰ νοὺν; coincidence contributed to his scheme, but, for the most part, his success depended on cunning (πρόνοια), in which he was the equal of any Roman commander. There is no corresponding assessment in Livy's account (32.37), aside from the note, at the conclusion of the Senate debate, that he was now more eager for war than peace (6). There are discrepancies, moreover, concerning Flaminius' authority "for war or peace," and the role of the allies and the "friends of Flaminius" in determining Roman policy.²⁰

since the loyalty of his allies is in question. But Livy misses the point: Philip says simply "It is an ancient custom...that young Aetolians serve [as mercenaries] even against their allies"; and Flaminius raises no question. The commentators do not appear to have taken Philip's allegation or Flaminius' concern seriously: cf. Walbank's *Comm. on Polybius* 2:557. On the Aetolian League, see J. A. O. Larsen *Greek Federal States* (Oxford 1968) 78–79, and 406–47.

²⁰ Livy's treatment gives the appearance that the agreement reached in private talks was scuttled by the allies (as Philip could have foreseen), whereas in Pol. the demand for the "fetters" is made at the instigation of the "friends of Flaminius":

Ut ventum Romam est, prius sociorum legati quam regis auditi sunt. Cetera eorum oratio conviciis regis consumpta est; moverunt eo maxime senatum, demonstrando maris terrarumque regionis eius situm, ut omnibus appareret, si...rex teneret, non posse liberam Graeciam esse. (Liv. 32.37.1)

πεπεισμένων δὲ τῶν τοῦ Τίτου φίλων μένειν τοὺς ὑπάτους ἀμφοτέροισι κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν... εἰσελθόντες εἰς τὴν σύγ-

Livy had conceded, in the prologue to the debate at Nicaea, that Flaminius (before he succeeded in the siege at Opus) was reluctant to negotiate, but was compelled to pursue a diplomatic solution for fear that his command would be discontinued and the victory would go to his successor. In Polybius it is a measure of his mastery of the situation that he is able to resolve his political difficulties along with the issue of war and peace. Once they were convinced that Flaminius would keep command, his φίλοι in the Senate saw to it that negotiations came to nothing. The issue was decided by one question, whether Philip would withdraw from Acrocorinth, Chalcis and Demetrias, "the fetters of Hellas," as Philip called them. Evidently their summit at Thronion had led the king to think that other issues would head the agenda: on these strategic points his ambassadors had no instructions and were dismissed without a hearing. Polybius implies (18.12.1) that provinces were assigned *after* this hearing, and we are led to suppose that Flaminius and his supporters controlled the policy decision in the Senate. In Livy's account, however, the question of prorogation was decided sometime before this hearing (28); the political maneuvers of the "friends of Flaminius" go unmentioned; and it is the allies *sua sponte* who force the issue, by their repeated accusations against Philip and by their insistence upon the strategic question of "the fetters." When Philip's ambassadors refuse to answer, we are left with the impression that Philip—who had first called for the conference at Nicaea, then maneuvered for private talks, and finally succeeded in having his terms put before the Senate—never intended to negotiate in good faith. Thus, in Livy's version the subterfuge of Philip and the intransigence of the allies force a shift in Roman policy toward the Liberation Doctrine, and Flaminius is not the master of Realpolitik that Polybius portrays. These revisions are evidently inspired by the popular tradition that Rome rose to world dominion *sociis defendendis*, the same tradition that shaped Livy's account of the outbreak of the war, as a *bellum iustum* provoked by Philip's treachery (above, note 10).

Livy's account of Flaminius' prorogation has clearly preserved the language of the annalistic version: *Quinctio liberum arbitrium pacis ac belli permissum* (32.37.5); this phrase goes well beyond Polybius 18.12.1, τῷ

κλητον πάντες κατηγοροῦν ἀποτόμως τοῦ Φιλίππου. (Pol. 18.11.2)

For the view that a secret agreement between Philip and Flaminius was derailed by hard-liners in the Senate, cf. Feyel (above, note 18) 241–43. The role of the friends of Flaminius also emerges in regard to Amynder: Polybius reveals at once the manipulative diplomacy of Flaminius and the complicity of a certain faction among the Senate (18. 10.7–8): Ἀμύνανδρον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἐξέπεμπε...γινώσκων αὐτὸν εὐάγων μὲν ὄντα καὶ ῥαδίως ἐξακολουθήσοντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ φίλοις, ἐφ' ὅποτέρ' ἂν ἄγωσιν αὐτόν, φαντασίαν δὲ ποιήσαντα καὶ προσδοκίαν διὰ τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὄνομα. Livy says simply (32.36.10) Amynder was chosen to lend prestige to the embassy, *ut speciem legationi adiceret*, and he was perhaps inspired to lend dignity to the embassy by the annalistic source who identified the envoy Q. Fabius as *uxoris Quincti sororis filius* (cf. Pol. τῆς γυναικὸς ἀδελφιδοῦς), to make clear that the wife of Flaminius was not a Fabia.

Τίτω τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, as Aymard observed.²¹ Livy's phrase, "full discretion for war or peace," in fact, appears inconsistent with the outcome of the Senate debate, from Polybius, wherein the Senate would consider no peace without "the fetters." This exaggeration of Flamininus' authority recalls the annalistic note on his prorogation at 32.28.9, *T. Quinctio imperium donec successor ex senatus consulto venisset*; here Livy's phrase implies automatic continuance of his command, though it is obvious elsewhere that his command was subject to the usual procedure for prorogation (33.25.1, 43.6). The tradition that special imperium was granted to Flamininus is closely joined to the annalistic chronology in 32.28.5–6—that early in 198 Flamininus was detained in Rome by religious duties, and delayed forty days in his province before taking the initiative—which, I have argued, derives from Valerius.²²

This annalistic perspective is also evident in Livy's account of the course of events in fall and winter 198/97. The Polybian version is indicated in Plut. *Flam.* 5–7, where the events proceed as follows:²³ (a) surrender of Opus, 5.4; (b) negotiations at Nicaea, 5.6; (c) alliance with Thebes, 6.4; (d) Senate debate and prorogation, 7.1–2. In Livy's account, Flamininus "reluctantly" agrees to negotiate at Nicaea (b), while the siege of Opus (a) is still under way (32.32); and *after* the Senate debate (d) concluding in 32.37, comes the curious triumph at Thebes (c) at the beginning of book 33. Thus the annalistic tradition gives a more dramatic shift to Flamininus' fortunes, from the frustrations of the first year, to the unbroken successes of the second. The pleas of the allies and the special imperium given Flamininus, *liberum arbitrium pacis ac belli donec successor ex senatus consulto venisset*, take on a more fateful significance.

The Victory at Kynoskephalai and the Declaration of Liberty at the Isthmus

The account of Kynoskephalai has been thoroughly analyzed for Livy's errors and editorial changes; there is no need to compare Livy's version and

²¹ Aymard, *Premiers Rapports* (above, note 12) 131 note 61, concludes, "L' idée ne s' en trouve pas dans Polybe"; he supposes Livy's phrase anticipates Flamininus' role in later negotiations; and he links this passage with the note on prorogation in 32.28.9.

²² Cf. 32.6.5–8; 9.8–10.1; 28.9; with notes 6, 9 and 14 above.

²³ The events at Thebes in Boeotia, along with the conference at Mykenica (32) were probably reported by Polybius in the winter of 198/7 before word of the Senate decision was conveyed to Greece. Livy, however, assumes that these events took place after the decision was reported in early spring 197. In the Polybian version in Plut., the liberation ideology of Nicaea won over many allies during the winter; in Livy it is only after the Senate's official commitment to the liberation doctrine that many allies are won. It is not unlikely that Livy was misled by the sequence of events in Val. Ant. and that Livy's source in error connected the events at Thebes in Boeotia with the later campaign against Thebes in Phthia. Such confusion in Livy's source probably accounts for the close collation of the two Theban episodes, though months apart, in Liv. 33.1–2 and 5. Similar confusion may be the cause of Livy's contradiction on the status of Phthiotic Thebes, in the debate at Tempe (33.13); see below, at note 34.

Polybius here in detail.²⁴ It will be useful, however, to draw a few points of comparison concerning the treatment of Flamininus, and then to consider the versions in Plutarch and Appian, where we find evidence of divergence from Polybius. Livy's adaptation, first of all, gives a different emphasis to the two major features of characterization in this episode: (1) the *hortationes* of Philip and Flamininus; and (2) the portrayal of their motives and "mental processes" in the course of the battle.

1) In Livy the usual paired speeches are handled in an unusual way. Philip's speech is presented as a preface to the entire campaign (33.11–4.3); he addresses the army of a nation that has been exhausted by generations of continuous warfare, with under-age recruits and retirees forced into service (3.1–5). As though on the eve of battle, he weighs past victories against recent reversals. There is no corresponding speech extant in Polybius, and in the battle itself there is no set speech given Philip in either version. Flamininus, however, harangues his troops at a crucial turn in the fighting; but, where Polybius, in *oratio recta*, emphatically dwells upon one theme, the confidence earned in recent victories, Livy gives only a few lines of indirect discourse and reintroduces the theme from his preface to this campaign: *fama stetisse non viribus Macedoniae regnum eam quoque famam tandem evanuisse*:

παρεμβάλων τὴν αὐτοῦ στρατιάν ἐξῆς ἅπασαν ἅμα μὲν ἐφήδρευε τοῖς προκινδυνεύουσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρεκάλει τὰς τάξεις ἐπιπορευόμενος. ἡ δὲ παράκλησις ἦν αὐτοῦ βραχεῖα μὲν ἐμφαντικὴ δὲ καὶ γνώριμος τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ἐναργῶς γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄχιν ἐνδεικνύμενος ἔλεγε... "Οὐχ οὗτοι Μακεδόνες εἰσὶν.....οὐς ὑμεῖς....ἐξεβάλετε...;"...ταῦτ' εἰπὼν τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν μέρος ἐκέλευε μένειν κατὰ χώραν καὶ τὰ θηρία πρὸ τούτων, τῷ δ' εὐωνύμῳ μετὰ τῶν εὐζώνων ἐπήει σοβαρῶς τοῖς πολεμίοις... (Pol. 18.23.1-3, 7)

laevo cum omni levi armatura in hostem vadit, simul admonens cum iisdem Macedonibus pugnatuos quos ad Epiri fauces...expugnassent ...fama stetisse non viribus Macedoniae regnum. Iam perventum ad suos in ima valle stantes. (Liv. 33.8.3–5)

In Livy's version, we are given the impression that Flamininus hurriedly addresses his troops on the march, as though he has not a moment to lose, where Polybius has emphasized the order and control that Flamininus imposed.²⁵ In Polybius, the orderly *paraklesis* points up the contrast between the two characters; in Livy's account the hurried harangue to troops on the march dramatizes the urgency. Flamininus is driven by the same turn of fortune

²⁴ Cf. Witte, "Ueber die Form der Darstellung" 382–87; Luce, *Livy*, 39–41; Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios*, 100–102, 187–89.

²⁵ It is possible that Livy at first misinterpreted the phrase *παρεμβάλων...ἅμα μὲν ἐφήδρευε...ἅμα δὲ παρεκάλει...* to mean that Flamininus "threw his whole force into the struggle...giving encouragement as he led out the reinforcements;" but the context makes it clear that Flamininus has drawn the legions into formation, giving orders to each contingent; only when he has finished his *hortatio* does he give the order to move out.

that leads Philip to ruin: *Idem et Romanus, magis necessitate quam occasione pugnae inductus, fecit* (8.3).

2) In the course of the battle, Livy reinterprets the reactions and decisions of the two commanders to give a more rapid pace to the narrative and a more dramatic sense of uncertainty. By these revisions, however, Flamininus receives less favorable treatment. Polybius portrays the Roman as the more masterful tactician, who responds decisively at each turn of events; in Livy's account, Flamininus, like Philip, seems more at the mercy of circumstances beyond his control. In Polybius, when Philip throws his main column into the struggle, Flamininus marshals his forces and gives encouragement to the troops in formation, and after his *hortatio*, holding the right wing in reserve with the elephants, he leads out the left to meet the enemy "in awesome array."

Polybius' more detailed account of the movements of the two armies gives a much better impression of Flamininus' tactics:

ὁ δὲ Τίτος, θεωρῶν οὐ δυνάμενους τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ στέγειν τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἔφοδον, ἀλλ' ἐκπιεζομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων... τοὺς ἐπὶ πόδα ποιουμένους τὴν ἀναχώρησιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δεξίοις μέρεσι καταλειπόμενας τῆς σωτηρίας τὰς ἐλπίδας, ταχέως ἀφορμήσας πρὸς τοὺτους, καὶ συνθεασάμενος [τῆς] τῶν πολεμίων τὰ μὲν συνεχῇ τοῖς διαγωνιζομένοις τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄκρων ἀκμὴν ἐπικαταβαίνοντα, τὰ δ' ἔτι τοῖς ἄκροις ἐφεστῶτα, προθέμενος τὰ θηρία προσῆγε τὰς σημαίας τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες, οὔτε τὸν παραγγελοῦντ' ἔχοντες οὔτε συστήναι δυνάμενοι καὶ λαβεῖν τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ἴδιον σχῆμα διὰ τε τὰς τῶν τόπων δυσχερείας καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις ἐπόμενοι πορείας ἔχειν διάθεσιν καὶ μὴ παρατάξως, οὐδὲ προσεδέξαντο τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔτι, δι' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν θηρίων πτοηθέντες καὶ διασπασθέντες ἐνέκλιναν. (Pol. 18.25.4-7).

In hos [sc. Macedones] incompósitos Quinctius, quamquam pedem referentes in dextro cornu suos cernebat, elephantis prius in hostem actis impetum facit, ratus partem profligatam cetera tracturam. Non dubia res fuit; extemplo terga vertere Macedones, terrore primo bestiarum aversi. (Liv. 33.9.6-7)

Polybius reports that Flamininus ordered the decisive maneuver of the Roman victory, based upon his own observation, using the terrain to advantage, catching his adversary unprepared. This decision is given but brief mention in Livy's account, and the success of the maneuver seems to depend more on terror of the elephants than superior tactics. Where Livy suggests that the Macedonians were routed in panic at the mere sight of the elephants, Polybius makes it clear that they were thrown into confusion by Flamininus' sudden move on the right, catching them in marching order, unable to form up in phalanx, on uneven ground, without an officer to lead them; against an enemy in disorder the charge of the elephants proves decisive.

These differences are usually explained in terms of narrative technique, but we should not fail to notice that Livy's revisions detract from Polybius' estimation of Flamininus; in Livy's account the outcome seems to be decided

more by accident than insight. Polybius gives greater emphasis to the merits of Flaminius' strategy, as he plotted the positions of his own men and his adversaries and deployed his forces with calculated success. In Livy's account the same maneuvers seem to be acts of desperation.

The element of fortune that gives greater drama to Livy's treatment was also given greater significance in the annalistic tradition. Plutarch, *Flam.* 7–9, is at odds with Polybius on a number of points, apparently influenced by later tradition: he reports paired speeches on the eve of battle, on the theme of the Fame of Macedon, ὄνομα δι' Ἀλέξανδρον ἀλκῆς (7.3); it is to be an historic contest in which Philip and the Romans vie for greatness with Alexander. In Livy's version of Flaminius' harangue, as we have seen, fame alone sustains the kingdom of Macedon, and that fame has faded (8.5, lacking in Polybius 23.2–7). In the tradition that Plutarch follows, Macedon's fallen fortunes are given an ironic dramatization as Philip delivers his *hortatio* from a burial mound and the whole army is stricken with fear at the omen! Such tragic fatalism is a popular theme in the annalistic tradition, as is the contest of history's greatest commanders.²⁶ Livy ignored the annalistic fable, but he was evidently influenced by his predecessor's account of the workings of fortune in the outcome of the battle.

Another incident that may have figured prominently in annalistic tradition is recalled at the Achaean conference in the closing frame of the pentad (35.48): the Aetolian Archidamus accuses Flaminius of cowardice at Kynoskephalai, claiming that he took refuge in prayer while the Aetolian cavalry turned the tide of battle.²⁷ A similar charge is credited by Plutarch (*Comp. Phil. Flam.* 2.3, without reference to context), and presumably Plutarch had found at least one account of the battle in which the allegation was substantiated. There is no reference to any such religious observance in Polybius' account of the battle, although the Greek historian refers to the valor of the Aetolian cavalry under Archidamus (18.21.5); and it is unlikely that he would have corroborated the

²⁶ Nissen, *KU* 290, attributes Philip's ill-omened *hortatio* to an *Anekdotensammlung*, along with various elements in ch. 9. For the role of Fortune and Nemesis in the *Annales* of Valerius Antias, cf. Walsh, *Livy* 122. The "vengeance of Τύχη" is apparently revealed in Polybius, 22.10.2, punishing Philip for his arrogance; and Briscoe, *Comm.* 280, supposes that the role of *fortuna* in Livy's account of Philip's losses after Kynoskephalai (33.18.1, *omnia simul inclinante fortuna*; 19.2, *undique se suosque exigente fortuna*) is drawn from Pol.; but see below, note 67. For the contest of history's greatest commanders, see below, note 64.

²⁷ In Livy's account Flaminius calls Achidamus a liar, and responds to the challenge of Antiochus with a parable (35.49): the king's army of many nations is like a feast of pork served with many different dressings to give the taste of wild game; despite their exotic attire, all his peoples are Syrian slaves. The same simile (without reference to the charge of cowardice) is recounted in Plut. *Flam.* 17.5 (cf. *Moralia* 197a), in a collection of witticisms all of which seem to derive from Polybius. It is reasonable to conclude that Livy in 35.48–49 has added the Aetolian slander from a second source also known to Plut., and Flaminius' response, which does not directly refer to the events at Kynoskephalai, derives from Pol.

Aetolian charges in another context, after so favorable a treatment of Flamininus at Kynoskephalai. Divine guidance at the crisis of battle seems to have been a favorite theme in the *annales*. It is not unlikely that Valerius (or an earlier annalist) described Flamininus making a vow in the midst of the fighting, as he reported the vow of Villius at the Aous.²⁸

Further testimony to the tradition that victory was decided by chance rather than superior tactics is found in Appian (*Mac.* 9.1). In explanation of the generous terms of the treaty, another rationale is given, in addition to the Polybian justification that Macedon was left intact to counter Antiochus: perhaps his unlikely success (τὸ παράδοξον τῆς νίκης) made Flamininus all the more eager for peace; Philip had been defeated not by his own failings but by unforeseeable misfortune (τό τε τῆς τύχης ἄδηλον...οὐ κατ' ἀσθένειαν ἀλλὰ πλεον ἐκ συντυχίας). There is no hint of this rationale in Polybius, and it is added to the Polybian material in Appian as an afterthought (τάχα δὲ...καί), possibly from the same *annales* that influenced Livy.²⁹

From Livy's comment on the casualty figures for Kynoskephalai (33.10.8–10), it is clear that Valerius Antias lay ready to hand, and we are given a rare glimpse of Livy's suspicion and regard for his chief Latin source:

Si Valerio qui credat omnium rerum immodice numerum augenti, quadraginta milia hostium eo die sunt caesa, capta—ibi modestius mendacium est—quinque milia septingenti...Claudius quoque duo et triginta milia caesa scribit...Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum.

Despite his mendacity—all the more because of it—Valerius must be taken into account. It does not appear that Livy was always so circumspect in assessing conflicting accounts of Roman policy as he is here in regard to the measure of victory.

Livy's account of the negotiations after Kynoskephalai, leading up to the Isthmus declaration, bears striking evidence of annalistic revisionism. These negotiations include major conferences at Tempe, within a few weeks after the battle, and in the spring of 196 with the ten commissioners at Corinth, as well as debate in the Senate, where Livy clearly followed the Latin annalists. Regarding the negotiations after the battle and the conference at Tempe (Liv.

²⁸ For the vow of Villius at the Aous, for which Val. Ant. is cited, Liv. 32.6.5–8, cf. note 6 above. For the theme of divine intervention in the crisis of battle, cf. A. Klotz, "Die Quellen der plutarchischen Lebensbeschreibung des Marcellus," *RhM* 83 (1934) 298–99, on Marcellus' vow at Clastidium; on the *haruspicia* before his fatal maneuver at Venusia, cf. Liv. 27.26–7; Klotz, *Livius* 182; and E. Carawan, in *CJ* 80 (1985) 140–41.

²⁹ Petzold (above, note 10) gives an elaborate explanation of Appian's sources for this theme and related episodes in Liv., in Exkurs 2, pp.113–14; he concludes that Appian made use of both annalistic and anti-Roman intermediaries without discretion; see also pp. 58–60, and cf. Nissen *KU* 116, who remarks Appian's "krankhafte Anlage Schwierigkeiten zu finden, wo keine sind, und abweichende Erklärungen und Motive unterzulegen, als wie sie in seiner Quelle standen."

33.11–13 = Pol. 18.34, 36–8) Livy's errors and editorial changes have been often discussed.³⁰ There are many points of divergence which indicate Valerian influence, though that implication has not been carefully considered.

Livy's apparent "distortion" of the meetings with Philip's ambassadors, before the Tempe conference, has been a subject of dispute. The first request of Philip's herald, for a truce to take up the dead, and Flaminius' cordial response, *adiecta etiam illa vox, bono animo esse regem... quae maxime Aetolos offendit* (11.3), is lacking in Polybius; and Polybius' report that three emissaries met with Flaminius "a few days after the battle" (34.4–5) is omitted in Livy. Holleaux argued that the first meeting was reported in the lost section of Polybius (33.8–34.1), and that Livy combined the two episodes, omitting mention of the second meeting, and suppressing a number of details unfavorable to Flaminius; he rejects the earlier view of Nissen and Klotz, that Livy's treatment involves annalistic contamination. Briscoe accepts the argument of Holleaux that two meetings were mentioned in Polybius, but concludes that Livy's adaptation shows "merely stylistic variation, not distortion"; thus he disregards the serious implications of Holleaux's view. The second meeting in Polybius is damning to the Roman's credibility with the allies, and Livy's omission amounts to a substantive change on a critical issue: Flaminius began negotiations in private (with only his own *tribuni militum* attending); and it was this meeting at Philip's rendezvous that prompted Aetolian charges of bribery and Polybius' digression on Roman integrity (35). It is more likely that Livy followed a divergent account in Valerius, as Nissen assumed before Holleaux's ingenious arguments. Livy, in fact, as Holleaux himself observed, appears to transpose the judgment of Polybius that Flaminius began to act arbitrarily without consulting the allies (34.3, before the "second embassy") into the allegations of the Aetolians (11.5–7). Such transposition is not simply a stylistic variation: as we have seen, it appears to be a means of resolving discrepancies in the major sources; in this instance, it may have been prompted by the annalistic theme of Aetolian treachery.

At Tempe, Flaminius proposed terms essentially similar to those offered before the victory, and he defended his policy of reconciliation in terms dear to the hearts of Livy's Augustan audience, *vetustissimum morem victis parcendi... adversus victos mitissimum quemque animum maximum habere* (33.12.7–9). The sentiment is suggested by Polybius 18. 37.7–10, νικῶντάς γε μὴν μετρίους καὶ πραεῖς καὶ φιλανθρώπους, but Livy omits the note that these are the same terms proposed before the battle, and he suppresses the Roman's ironic reminder that "the Aetolians have the right to consider their own interests." When the Aetolians object that Philip will pose a danger to liberty, Polybius reports that Flaminius in anger interrupted Phaeneas, "παῦσαι... ληρῶν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὕτως χειριῶ τὰς διαλύσεις ὥστε μηδὲ βουλευθέντα τὸν Φίλιππον ἀδικεῖν δύνασθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας." Livy has Phaeneas interrupt Flaminius, who then, with suitable Roman *gravitas*,

³⁰ Cf. Nissen *KU* 34–35; Klotz in *Hermes* 50 (1915) 52122; Holleaux (above, note 2) 86–103, esp. 91; and Briscoe *Comm.* 267. Holleaux is followed, with some refinements, by K. Sacks in *JHS* 95 (1975) 98–102.

answers, "desistite tumultuari...non iis condicionibus illigabitur rex ut movere bellum possit" (33.12.13). The patriotic aim and dramatic effect of reversing the roles is apparent, but the change of wording in the guarantee against aggression has not been fully appreciated. In Polybius, Flamininus promises to guard the Greeks against *adikia*; Livy's version (*non iis condicionibus...ut movere bellum possit*) clearly anticipates a clause of the treaty prohibiting Philip from military action outside his borders without consent of the Senate (33.30.6, *bellum...ne iniussu senatus gereret*), which, as we shall see (below, note 37), is patent "annalistic fabrication." In Polybius, the terms that Flamininus dictates leave Philip's power intact to counter Aetolian aggression; and it is in resentment of his efforts to block their ascendancy that the Aetolians soon side with Antiochus (18. 39.1–2).³¹

In Livy's account Aetolian "grievances" are part of a propaganda campaign with little substance. In six speeches the Aetolians lead the protest that liberation is a meaningless slogan, *vana species libertatis*; the Greeks have only changed one master for another; and in book 35 Antiochus takes up the challenge to "liberate" the Greeks from Roman domination.³² The course of the narrative derives from Polybius, who apparently approved Flamininus' tactics to thwart Aetolian ambitions,³³ but the development of this theme in the speeches,

³¹ Flamininus evidently distorts the terms of the treaty of 212/11 (*SEG* 13.383). Sacks, *JHS* 95 (1975) 103–6, argues that Flamininus' misrepresentation was meant to be self-evident in Polybius' account (18.38.8–9), and that the Roman's contempt of the Aetolians contributes to their justifiable ὀργή, and to Polybius' conception of the growth of Roman imperialism; but cf. D. Mendels in *Ancient Society* 15 (1984) 63–73.

³² E.g., 33.31.1, *litteras inanes vana specie libertatis adumbratas*; 34.23.5–10, *titulo libertatis ostentato*; 34.49.6, *mutatos pro Macedonibus Romanos dominos*; 35.16.2, *specioso titulo*; 35.31.11, *specie liberam*; 35.32.9, *omne sub nutum dicionemque Romanam*; 35.46.6, *liberandae re, non verbis et simulatione, quod fecissent Romani*. The same theme is prominent in the debate with Nabis, 34.31–32, *titulus liberatae Graeciae*. In Flamininus' dealings with Antiochus the liberation mandate is a bargaining position: if Antiochus recognizes Roman hegemony in Europe, the Romans will give up their commitment to the Greeks in Asia (34.58).

³³ Aetolian arrogance and resentment of Flamininus is revealed in Plutarch (*Flam.* 9). An ironic epitaph was composed by one Alcaeus for the dead at Kynoskephalai, in praise of the Aetolians, in mockery of Philip, and much to the displeasure of Flamininus: "Unburied and unlamented, on this ridge of Thessaly we lie thirty thousand dead, beaten by the Aetolians and the Romans Titus led...swifter than the fleeing deer the courage of Philip fled." Philip responded in an epigram of his own: "Leafless and limbless, on this ridge a cross stands [waiting] for Alcaeus!" This anecdote befits the character of Philip in Polybius, and it would fit neatly before the fragment beginning ch. 34 of book 18 (δυσχερῶς δ' ἔφερε καὶ τὴν ἀλαζονείαν αὐτῶν), on the causes of resentment between Flamininus and Aetolians. Nissen, *KU* 145 note, supposed that this story is taken from a collection of such anecdotes, but it is closely joined to the Polybian material in the closing sections of ch. 9. A similar instance of Philip's penchant for grousing verse is given by Polybius in 23.10.10.

at such length, is likely to be inspired by an annalistic tradition that treated Aetolian grievances as an implausible pretext, and their alliance as *infida societas*. The cynical manipulation of allied interests that Polybius portrays is not likely to have met with approval from the advocates of Roman *Fides*-propaganda.

Annalistic revision on the theme of Aetolian treachery is revealed in discrepancies on the "first provocation" of hostilities to come. Plutarch reports (*Flam.* 8.5) that the Aetolians were responsible for Philip's escape from Kynoskephalai, when they gave up the pursuit to plunder the Macedonian camp; this episode was, moreover, the first of grievances between the two sides (9.1). Polybius also reports a dispute over the plunder, but he does not blame the Aetolians for Philip's escape, and he does not regard this incident as the first cause of resentment between the two allies. The dispute over Thessaly, in Polybius' view, was the ἀρχὴ κακῶν...ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς διαφορᾶς...ἐξεκαύθη πόλεμος (18.39.2). Livy, however, confused the status and strategic significance of Thessaly and Thebes in Phthia; of Thebes he concluded, *haec belli causae magnarumque ex eo cladum iis fuerunt* (33.13.13). For Livy, the Aetolians' complaint has little substance.

The error in Livy's version of the debate on control of Thessalian cities (Larisa, Pharsalus, etc.) and Phthiotic Thebes is often disregarded as a minor lapse in translation—it has even been suggested that we emend the text—but conflation is a more plausible solution. When Philip announced that he would relinquish control to the Aetolians, Flamininus refused to allow the Aetolians to take over *any* of these cities *but* Thebes, which alone had rejected the Roman alliance (Pol. 18.38). Livy, however, reverses the distinction and reports that Flamininus refused to give up *only* Thebes. It is not surprising that Livy or his Latin source misconstrued the rather elliptical phrase in Polybius, but Livy later contradicts himself, giving the same arguments reported in Polybius, which assume the Thessalian cities are to be freed and Thebes left under Aetolian control. It is likely, then, that Livy began the debate with an annalistic treatment of Aetolian greed and intransigence, and then turned to Polybius for a fuller account.³⁴

Livy also follows the *annales* for the report of the victory and the audience given Philip's ambassadors at Rome (24), which he dates *exitu ferme anni* 197. As Nissen pointed out (*KU* 143), the letter of Flamininus must have been read

³⁴ An annalistic variant is also indicated in the synchronism at 14.1, *ut quidam tradidere eodem die...*; cf. Nissen *KU* 141. In Pol. 18.38, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν οὐδεμίαν, Θήβας δὲ μόνον, the adhaerent οὐ governs the infinitive δεῖν, with αὐτοὺς παραλαμβάνειν supplied from Philip's answer preceding. "Flamininus said that they (sc. the Aetolians) *must not* take over *any* of the other cities, but only Thebes." Cf. H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* 2692. The contradiction in Livy's account is so egregious that Weissenborn was tempted to emend the text. Cf. Briscoe, *Comm.* 273; W. Flurl, *Deditio in Fidem* (Munich 1969) 107–15. The annalist may have assumed that the city of Thebes in question had joined the Roman alliance *sua voluntate*, as had Thebes in Boeotia. There is further evidence of confusion in the annalistic tradition on events at Thebes in Liv. 33.1–5; see notes 23 and 36.

and acknowledged long before year's end. A commission of ten was decreed *more maiorum* to advise Flamininus in the settlement of Greek affairs; among the ten were named Sulpicius and Villius, Flamininus' predecessors in the Macedonian command. The continued involvement of these consulares should probably be seen as a gesture of solidarity within the Senate leadership, rather than a sign of party rivalry as is sometimes assumed. There was, however, an initial disagreement between Flamininus and the commissioners, and that dispute was obviously subject to conflicting treatment in the annalistic tradition. According to Polybius, whom Livy here follows closely, the commissioners at last prevailed over Flamininus to retain control of "the fetters," Acrocorinth, Chalcis and Demetrias, in view of the threat from Antiochus. Plutarch (*Flam.* 10), however, supposes that Flamininus prevailed, and all of the occupied cities were freed by the Isthmus declaration; that simplistic view probably derives from the same annalistic fabrication that is evident in Livy's account of the treaty.³⁵

After the Senate decision and affairs at Rome at the turn of the year 196, Livy has inserted an account of the assassination of Brachyllas and events in Boeotia, based upon Polybius. The discrepancy concerning Flamininus' complicity between Livy's account (33.28) and Polybius (18.43) is often cited as a clear example of "patriotic alteration" by Livy's own hand: Polybius reports that Flamininus condoned the murder; Livy attributes such charges to the Boeotians themselves (29.1–2).³⁶ This transposition suggests that Livy met with conflicting traditions, and there is evidence of divergence in the annalistic tradition in Plut. *Flam.* 6.1. Plutarch reports that Brachyllas led the opposition to the Roman alliance at Thebes in the winter of 198/7, whereas Polybius makes it clear that Brachyllas had already joined Philip at Nicaea (18.1.2); Livy, as we have seen (above, note 23), narrated the events according to Polybius but followed the annalistic chronology.

It is clear that Livy met with conflicting accounts of Flamininus' settlement of Greek affairs in his Latin sources. For the terms of the treaty

³⁵ Plutarch says simply that the fetters were freed along with the other cities, and in this view he probably followed a late annalistic account of the treaty. Valerius Antias, in particular, seems to have invented various clauses to discount the allies' complaints; cf. note 38. Livy, however, follows Polybius, acknowledging that their claims were not without substance, *nec tota ex vano criminatio erat* (33.31.4); cf. Pol. 18.45.2, καὶ τινὰς ἐλάμβανον πιθανότητας ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐγγράπτων.

³⁶ On the assassination of Brachyllas (Liv. 33.28; Pol. 18.43), cf. Briscoe, *Comm.* 300–301; Walbank, *Comm. Polybius* 2:27. The involvement of Italian soldiers evidently provoked terrorism against the Romans (33.29). The one incriminating detail that Livy does not suppress also indicates the treachery of the Aetolians: *ab sex armatis, quorum tres Italici, tres Aetoli erant, circumventus occiditur*; in Polybius, the Aetolian *strategos* Alexamenus arranged the assassination, and we are left with the impression that an equal number of Italians were used precisely to implicate the Romans. This detail may have been included in an annalistic tradition, where the treachery of the Aetolians tends to discredit Flamininus.

itself, he consulted the annals of Claudius and Valerius: he cites them by name for provisions of the treaty lacking in Polybius; and in one crucial clause (33.30.6), where he cites no authority, it is clear that he has been seduced by "annalistic fabrication." Livy tells us that Philip is forbidden from any military action beyond Macedon without consent of the Roman Senate. This is undoubtedly an inference by Valerius Antias, based upon the earlier treaty with Carthage. Claudius, on the other hand, reported that Philip was specifically restricted from military action against Eumenes, the successor of Attalus (30.9). The tradition that Philip's foreign involvements were subject to Senatorial control suppresses the policy of conciliation toward the eastern kings, and thus removes the grounds of resentment among the allies that is to be such a prominent theme in the middle books of the decade. Attributed to Valerius (30.10–11) is the tradition that the Romans made extravagant concessions to Attalus, Rhodes, and Athens, which also seems contrived to answer the protest *vana species libertatis*.³⁷

In the declaration of liberty itself, Livy has given a different perspective to the material in Polybius.³⁸ As Polybius tells it, even before the herald had read

³⁷ Most surprising is the note that Paros, Imbros, Delos and Skyros were granted to Athens (30.11), as though to restore her ancient command of the Aegean. For the "annalistic fabrication," *bellum extra Macedoniae fines ne iniussu senatus gereret*, and other discrepancies, cf. Petzold (above, note 10) 105; Briscoe, *Comm.* 304–7. Appian reports (*Mac.* 9.3) that the Senate imposed harsher conditions than those proposed by Flamininus, to his discredit. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* 60–62, regards Livy's correlation of sources here as "exceptional," and, presumably, not indicative of his usual practice.

³⁸ Liv. 33.33.4–7:

Nec praesens tantum modo effusa est laetitia, sed per multos dies... renovata: esse aliquam in terris gentem quae sua impensa, suo labore ac periculo bella gerat *pro libertate* aliorum, nec hoc finitimis...sed maria traiciat, ne quod toto orbe terrarum iniustum imperium sit, ubique ius, fas, lex potentissima sint. Una voce praeconis *libertas* omnis Graeciae atque Asiae urbes; hoc spe concipere audacis animi fuisse, ad effectum adducere et virtutis et fortunae...

Pol. 18.46.13–15:

δοκούσης δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ὑπερβολικῆς...πολὺ καταδεεστέραν εἶναι...συνέβαινε τοῦ τῆς πράξεως μεγέθους. θαυμαστὸν...τὸ Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς προαιρήσεως...ὥστε πᾶσαν ὑπομῆναι δαπάνην καὶ πάντα κίνδυνον χάριν τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας...μέγιστον ἔτι τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἀντιπαῖσαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν...ὥστε διὰ κηρύγματος ἑνὸς ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἑλληνας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐλευθέρους...γενέσθαι.

On Livy's adaptation, lending vividness to the scene, cf. K. Witte, "Ueber die Form der Darstellung" 281–3, 362–63; Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* 99–100. Recently, A. Schönberger, in *Latinitas* 1986, "*Quomodo T. Livius Liberationem Graeciae Describat atque Iudicet*," 83–95, has also remarked the irony of Livy's

out all the cities to be freed, the cheering was deafening, and the multitude cried out in disbelief, ὥς ἂν εἰ καθ' ὕπνον ἀκούειν, to have the declaration read again (18.46.6–8). In Livy's account, when all the long list of cities had been read, there was a murmur of wonder, each among the audience turning to his neighbor—*velut ad somni vanam speciem*—and then they called out for the herald to read the declaration again (33.32.7–8). It is usually assumed that this dramatic detail is Livy's own, but Plutarch gives a similar scene, and it is likely that he found it not in Livy (nor Polybius) but in Valerius Antias, notorious for exaggeration. Plutarch gives other details, such as the tale that shouts of the crowd felled birds from the sky, that Nissen and Klotz attributed to the *annales*—and that Livy wisely ignored.³⁹ Livy's revision of the Polybian material, nonetheless, appears to be influenced by an annalistic tradition in which the treachery of the allies was given greater emphasis, and Flamininus, for his futile crusade, was held to blame. Livy has recast Polybius' praise of Roman intervention in the words of the rejoicing Greeks themselves; and he does not share the Greek historian's unqualified praise: "however extravagant the celebration may seem, it fell far short of the achievement." Livy's account, on the contrary, seems to foreshadow the failure of the Flamininus Doctrine.

The War with Nabis, and the Coming of War with Antiochus

In the second panel of the pentad, books 34–35, the arrangement of material in itself is often seen as evidence of Livy's reliance on Polybius. In both books Greek affairs predominate: book 34 begins with the debut of Cato but closes with Flamininus' victory over Nabis and Triumph at Rome; book 35 contains very little as momentous as the events of the two books preceding. In this lull before the storm, the affairs of the Aetolians, who shifted their allegiance to Antiochus, and of the Achaeans, who affirmed their loyalty to Rome, are given prominence and detailed treatment beyond the scope that would have been allotted to them in more eventful books.⁴⁰ As Livy concedes, he has taken a circuitous route to reveal the causes of the war with Antiochus, *abstulere me velut de spatio Graeciae res immixtae Romanis...quia causae cum Antiocho fuerunt belli* (35.40.1). The role of Flamininus is given correspondingly greater emphasis than we would expect to find in the *annales*, and his influence to win the loyalty of the Achaeans, as the tide of disaffection turns, is given pivotal importance in the final chapter of the pentad (35.48–50). Little of Polybius survives, but there are a number of indications that Livy has combined material from the annalistic tradition with Polybian *res Graeciae*, to give the fullest account.

In Livy's account, the Achaean alliance lends legitimacy to the doctrine of liberation. Rather than revisionism, there is a cynicism evident in Livy's handling of the diplomatic maneuvers that probably derives in part from Polybius.

version. On Plutarch's version, cf. Nissen, *KU* 290–91

³⁹ Nissen *KU* 290–91; Klotz, "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 48. cf. Val. Max. 4.8.5. Livy, at 29.25.3–4, cites Coelius for a similar exaggeration.

⁴⁰ On the scope and structure of these books, see Luce, *Livy* (above, note 3) 35–36 and 46–53: "The truth is that the events of 193–92 did not warrant nearly a book and a half."

In the war with Nabis, we are reminded that Flaminius preferred a negotiated settlement to a protracted struggle from purely self-interested motives. The Roman gains his objectives by manipulating the concerns of his allies; and in the negotiations with Nabis, as in the ultimatum to Antiochus, it is all too evident that the Liberation Doctrine is more of a bargaining position than a principle of ideology. All of this seems to suit the character we have met in Polybius. But there are also signs of an annalistic tradition that presented the events in a different order and denied Flaminius even the modest diplomatic successes that he had won in Polybius.

In the debate on war with Nabis, the speech of Flaminius bears the obvious imprint of annalistic *Fides*-propaganda.⁴¹ He pretends to act as an arbiter of Greek disputes, referring the question of Argos to his allies (*refero enim ad vos utrum Argos...ab Nabide occupatos pati velitis sub dicione eius esse*). The Roman's only interest is to fulfill the doctrine of liberation; it is the Greeks' concern to halt the tyrant's aggression (*ne serpat latius contagio eius mali*, 34.22.10–13). In the decision to attack Sparta directly rather than besiege Argos, Aristaenus is made the advocate of Roman objectives; in this way the later decision to leave Nabis in control of Lacedaemon provokes no comment. But in the debate with Nabis himself, the tyrant exposes the inconsistency of Roman demands. Flaminius defends the liberation mandate at length, but he has no cogent reply to Nabis' claims of legitimacy, and his arguments carry little conviction.⁴² Although Nabis agrees to withdraw from Argos under truce (33.3, 35.3), his garrison holds the acropolis until Sparta is besieged (40.6). Once again, Flaminius appears to be outmaneuvered by his Greek adversary.

Flaminius then finds himself in a diplomatic predicament: the majority of the allies urge him to continue the war against Lacedaemon, though he never seriously intended to carry out the siege. He foresees a long and difficult

⁴¹ Petzold (above, note 10) 54–55 and note 23, points to the propagandist theme of “aiding and abetting” the Carthaginians on the part of Philip, in this speech (34.22.8) and related passages. Petzold, however, assumes annalistic adaptation of Polybius, rather than editorial revision by Livy.

⁴² Flaminius argues that earlier treaties were valid only with a legitimate government, and it is inconsistent for the Romans to free the Greeks from Philip but leave Lacedaemon in a tyrant's power, with obvious echoes of earlier propaganda:

Nam quid minus conveniret quam eos qui *pro libertate* Graeciae adversus Philippum gereremus bellum cum tyranno instituere amicitiam?...Nobis vero, etiam si Argos nec cepisses per fraudem nec teneres, *liberantibus* omnem Graeciam Lacedaemon quoque vindicanda in antiquam *libertatem*...Argos et Lacedaemon, duas clarissimas urbes...sub pedibus tuis relinquemus, quae titulum nobis *liberatae* Graeciae servientes deformant?...quid ad vos, Romani? Hoc tu dicas *liberantibus* Graeciam? Hoc iis qui, ut *liberare* possent, mare traiecerunt, terra marique bellum gesserunt? (34.33.3–5,13)

For the weakness of Flaminius' argument, see D. Mendels in *SCI* 4 (1978) 38–44.

operation, and he adds, as though it were recent intelligence, the threat of invasion by Antiochus makes further efforts against Lacedaemon ill-advised (33.9–14). His unspoken concern, however, is that his command may be discontinued and the victory left to the glory of his successor. The allies have taken up the same arguments that Flamininus had urged earlier against Nabis, that the Roman liberator should not appear to sanction an unjust regime, and that Nabis unopposed will continue to threaten the liberty of his neighbors (33.8). The Roman turns them from their resolve by pretending to yield to the majority, *simulando se transire in eorum sententiam* (34.1), while presenting a pessimistic analysis of the logistics required to sustain the siege. Livy observes that he cynically relied upon the obstacles to concerted action that liberty itself imposes, *libertatem difficilem ad consensum* (34.8). By this ploy Flamininus was granted discretion to negotiate a treaty with Nabis. Preoccupied with his own political liabilities, he offered generous terms, and, although Nabis made a show of defiance, Flamininus ultimately recognized the tyranny as a legitimate government. This concession was to be a chief cause of resentment among the allies.

After the victory over Nabis, Flamininus proclaimed the liberation of Argos at the Nemean games, and Livy's account of this second "Declaration of Liberty" echoes the celebration at the Isthmus of the previous year.⁴³ In the midst of this celebration, however, the voices of discontent also were heard. The Achaeans were disappointed that Lacedaemon was left subject to Nabis, *serva Lacedaemon relicta et lateri adhaerens tyrannus non sincerum gaudium praebebant*. And the Aetolians protested that Roman concessions to Nabis were inconsistent with their stated policy, *tyranno relictam Lacedaemonem... Nabidis dominationis satellitem factum populum Romanum* (41.6–7).

In his account of these events it is generally agreed that Livy has followed Polybius closely, and here he has done little to conceal his protagonist's pragmatism and ambition. Throughout the Spartan campaign Flamininus has relied upon the liberation mandate as a bargaining position, first to turn allied sentiment against Lacedaemon, and then to win Nabis' promise to withdraw from Argos. Just as in the negotiations at Nicaea, the Roman's concessions are motivated by his concern that victory would be left to his successor. In Livy's account of these motives and maneuvers there are few signs of revisionism. There are, however, three testimonia to indicate that Livy has rearranged the material in Polybius to achieve a closer unity with the annalistic addenda.

Livy himself acknowledges a divergence in the annalistic tradition (41.8–10); the Polybian chronology in Plut. *Flam.* 12 suggests that Livy has

⁴³ Liv. 34.41.1–3:

Laeta civitas celeberrimum festorum dierum ac nobile ludicrum Nemeorum...in adventum Romani exercitus ducisque indixerunt praefeceruntque ludis ipsum imperatorem. Multa erant quae gaudium cumularent...libertatem ex longo intervallo libertatisque auctores Romanos, quibus causa bellandi cum tyranno ipsi fuissent, cernebant. Testata quoque ipso Nemeorum die voce praeconis libertas est Argivorum.

rearranged the order of events; and there is also an alternate tradition in Zon. 9.18, on the campaign against Nabis. Plutarch reports that Flamininus presided at the Nemean games and proclaimed the liberation of Argos *before* the campaign against Nabis.⁴⁴ There is a hint of confusion in Livy's awkward transition to the liberation of Argos, *dum oppugnatur tyrannus* (40.5); and the welcome given Flamininus as Liberator (41) is added unconvincingly to the report that the Argives themselves expelled the Spartan garrison. This episode is all the more suspect if we consider that the Argives then found themselves subject to the Achaean league, from which they had seceded to Philip over the question of the Roman alliance. It is, in fact, more reasonable to assume that the second Celebration of Liberty, at Argos, came soon after a victory over Nabis, such as Dio's version suggests (ἐπὶ τὸ Ἄργος ἐπεστράτευσε, Zon. 9.18), and such as Livy's annalistic source seems to have described (41.8–10). In this scenario, it would appear that the recriminations of Aetolians and Achaeans, in response to the Argos proclamation, induced Flamininus to make a show of resolve against Sparta, and so again the Roman is led on by unworthy allies into deeper involvement. It is possible that Livy purposefully positioned the "second declaration" and the Achaean response before the announcement at Corinth that Roman forces would be withdrawn, but it is also likely that Livy was misled by a partisan tradition in the *annales*.⁴⁵

After the Argos proclamation Livy makes reference to an alternate version

⁴⁴ In Plut. *Flam.* 12 the Nemean Games are reported along with other events of 196, the liberation of Chalcis and Magnesia, and Villius' conference with Antiochus (cf. Liv. 33.39). It is possible that Plutarch's direct source here is a digression in Posidonios, since these events are reported in connection with a testimonial to the magnanimity of Flamininus, and the anecdote concerning Xenocrates (12.4). Peter (above, note 4) suggested the influence of Posidonios in ch. 16, on Flamininus' intercession on behalf of the Chalcidians. Posidonios himself is likely to have followed Polybius.

⁴⁵ From Diod. 28.13 it is generally assumed that Polybius was Livy's chief source for this second council at Corinth early in 194, but discrepancies indicate annalistic revision in Livy. In Diodorus the treaty with Nabis and the order for withdrawal of Roman forces has been ratified by decree of the Senate, ἔδοξε τῇ γερονσίᾳ βεβαιοῦν τὰς ὁμολογίας καὶ τὰς φρουρὰς...ἀπάγειν; in Livy's account there is no mention of the Senate decree. The discontent of the allies is voiced again, in the same terms they had used at Argos, *id minime conveniens liberanti Graeciam videbatur, tyrannum reliquisse non suae solum patriae gravem, sed omnibus circa civitatibus metuendum, haerentem visceribus nobilissimae civitatis* (34.48.5–6). Flamininus can only answer that the liberation of Lacedaemon would have involved its destruction; *si sine excidio Lacedaemonis fieri potuisset, fatebatur pacis cum tyranno mentionem admittendam auribus non fuisse*... (49.1–3). There is a suggestion of that justification in Diodorus, but there is also a further rationale not given in Livy: περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Νάβιν ἀπελογεῖτο, διότι κατὰ τὸ δύναμιν πεποιήκασι, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ δήμου [sc. τῶν Ῥωμαίων] προαίρεσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατοικοῦντές εἰσιν ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἀφρούρητοι καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις πολιτευόμενοι. The last phrase would indicate that the legitimacy of Nabis' regime was recognized in official policy.

of Nabis' defeat (41.8–10, followed by annalistic *res Romanae*); exaggerated casualty figures (14,000 killed, 4000 prisoners) suggest that this is the work of Valerius Antias. In this annalistic version, Nabis was defeated in pitched battle rather than by siege; and, from Livy's paraphrase, it would appear that Nabis marched out to meet the allied force on the road to Argos, where, from Polybius, Livy has reported a minor skirmish, *haud magno certamine* (26.3).⁴⁶ In the variant we are told that the tyrant's strategy was based on the hope that Aetolian *auxilia* would join him. Disappointed in this expectation, he was compelled to join battle, and, as a consequence of that defeat, he sued for peace. These discrepancies point to a very different interpretation of the issues. In Livy's account, Nabis at first promised to relinquish Argos, and it was only the prospect of a long and arduous siege at Sparta that persuaded the allies to negotiate. In the annalistic version that rationale for the generous terms given Nabis is lost. Moreover, the belief that Aetolian contingents were to join Nabis in open hostilities against the Romans gives a more dramatic emphasis to the Aetolian charges at Argos (41.6–7, immediately preceding the annalistic variant), and those which Flamininus addresses at Corinth, *male commissam libertatem populo Romano...et mutatos pro Macedonibus Romanos dominos* (49.6). The annalistic tradition, revealed in 41.8–10, was undoubtedly critical of the policy of total withdrawal which Flamininus pursued despite the imminent Aetolian uprising.

In the third Declaration of Liberty, upon withdrawal of Roman forces from Corinth, Livy's Flamininus delivers a surprising admonition on the responsible exercise of independence, *libertate modice utantur...libertatem sua cura custodirent servarentque, ut populus Romanus dignis datam libertatem ac munus suum bene positum sciret* (49.8–11). This speech provokes an emotional response much like the jubilation at the Isthmus, but foreshadowing the futility of Flamininus' words: *Paulisper fremitus approbantium dicta fuit monentiumque aliorum alios ut eas voces velut oraculo missas in pectora animosque demitterent* (50.1–3). It is likely that this scene was drawn from Polybius, but in Livy's arrangement it becomes an ironic prologue to the settlement of Thessaly and the events of book 35. That irony overshadows the withdrawal of Roman forces (34.50–51, presumably from Polybius), and the triumph of Flamininus at Rome (52.3–10), which is confidently assigned to annalistic sources.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Liv. 34.41.8–9:

Sunt qui non ex oppido proficiscentem bellum gessisse tyrannum tradant, sed *castris adversus Romana positis castra* diuque cunctatum, quia Aetolorum auxilia expectasset, coactum ad extremum acie configere impetu in pabulatores suos a Romanis facto.

Some of the phrasing may be the wording of Livy's source. Against Nissen's view (*KU* 210), that the variant at 41.8–10 indicates Livy had not read ahead in this source, cf. Luce, *Livy* 202.

⁴⁷ On the scene at the Nemean games, cf. Briscoe *Comm.* 126; Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios*, 138 note 3. It is generally assumed that Livy's source for the

It is likely that Polybius gave a more favorable account of the settlement of affairs in central Greece, which Livy, influenced by a sceptical account in the *annales*, disregarded. In Thessaly and Magnesia Flamininus imposed constitutional settlements that endured not only to Livy's own day but with only minor changes to the time of Diocletian. For Livy it seems to be a futile endeavor, "to restore some semblance of order" to a lawless land where "no assembly or council was ever held without a riot," *ad nostram usque aetatem* (34.51.4–5). Livy's phrase is often taken as an anachronistic adaptation of Polybius, but, as it stands, the phrase clearly implies that Flamininus has undertaken to impose order in a political arena where orderly self-government is untenable.⁴⁸ Thus Livy or his source foreshadows the fiasco at Demetrias where Flamininus swore the gods to witness the treachery of the Magnetes (35.31, possibly from Valerius), and their rejection of the Roman alliance (35.39, with conflation; cf. note 50); he passes over an administrative triumph with the incidental phrase, *cum percensuisset Thessaliam*. It is likely that Polybius gave greater recognition to this aspect of the Liberation, but in Livy's Latin source the accomplishment was ignored.

As though to mock the admonitions of Flamininus, in the closing sections of book 35 the ideology of liberation is given a new interpretation at the Aetolian conference of 192, *ea autem in libertate posita est, quae suis stat viribus, non ex alieno arbitrio pendet* (35.32.11). "Liberty" implies self-determination, and independence involves the right to act unhindered by the Roman hegemony. On that principle, the Aetolians call in Antiochus to liberate the Greeks from Roman domination. Plutarch *Flam.* 15.1, also attributes the slogan of Liberation to the Aetolian provocateurs, in a passage paired with the siege of Naupactus (after Thermopylai), where Plutarch's source, at odds with the Polybian version in Livy, portrayed Flamininus in tears at the failure of the Liberation.⁴⁹

withdrawal of Roman forces (50–52) is Polybius but the Latin annalist lay ready to hand for the account of the triumph; cf. Nissen *KU* 161f; Klotz, "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 47–48 (reading οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀντίαν in *Flam.* 14). The plan for withdrawal inevitably faced opposition within the ranks of the Senate, and it is likely that senatorial opposition was reflected in the annalistic tradition. Briscoe supposes that the proposal for total withdrawal was opposed by the Fulvians above, notes 2, 44); Scullard, that Scipio himself opposed the withdrawal, while Cato supported it (*Roman Politics 220–150 BC* [Oxford, 2nd ed. 1973] 116–18).

⁴⁸ Nissen (*KU* 162), recognizing the anachronism, assumed that Livy's phrase "ist nur im Sinne des Polybios verständlich"; the rhetorical flourish, however, suggests that Livy's error is more than an unthinking translation. On the merits of Flamininus' settlement of 194, see David Armstrong and Joseph J. Walsh in *CP* 81.1 (1986) 32–46.

⁴⁹ A different perspective on Flamininus' offices for his Greek *clientela* is indicated in the Naupactus episode after Thermopylai. At Naupactus, Livy tells us (36.34–35.6), he responded to appeals from the besieged Aetolians to intercede with M.' Glabrio, and, by his personal influence, he easily persuaded his superior officer and prevailed upon his former allies. Plutarch, *Flam.* 15.4–5, presents quite a different picture: when the besieged citizens implored his aid, he turned away in despair and wept, and only afterward persuaded Glabrio to grant a truce. In

The negotiations with Antiochus' ambassadors at Rome (34.57–9) and in Achaëa (35. 48–50) form the epilogues to books 34 and 35. In the first of these pivotal episodes, the cynical Realpolitik of the Liberation Doctrine is revealed in the ultimatum to Antiochus, either to withdraw from the Chersonese and recognize the Roman sphere of influence in Europe, or face a Roman campaign of liberation in Asia. This tactic is much like the demand to Nabis, to withdraw from Argos or face a siege at Sparta. In both arguments the Roman commitment to liberation is negotiable, and in both cases Flamininus expected to achieve his objectives without war. In the debate at Rome, he succeeded in convincing the Senate to withdraw Roman forces; but in Achaëa he received an answer to his ultimatum. It is here that the Aetolians charge Flamininus with cowardice, and Flamininus answers with a parable; and, as we have seen (above, note 27), in Livy's handling of these details, there is further evidence of annalistic contamination.

As Livy approaches the final round of negotiations in book 35, there are three further indications that he has combined material from the *annales* with Polybius. He concedes that the Greek material has distorted the arrangement of his narrative, *abstulere me velut de spatio Graeciae res inmixtae Romanis* (40.1); as he turns from Greek affairs to *res Italiae*, his confusion results in a doublet account of L. Quinctius' Gallic campaign (40.2–4; cf. 21–22.4) probably derived from Valerius.⁵⁰ And in the chapter preceding (39), involving Flamininus and Villius in an unsuccessful bid to win the allegiance of the Magnesians at Demetrias, there are further signs of conflation. In this episode Eumenes is mentioned without any earlier reference to his role in these events; and we are first told that Flamininus himself set out for Demetrias, then that Villius arrived, only to be denied entrance. The editors have tried to solve the puzzle by inserting the name Villius into Flamininus' operations, *et <Villium> ad Demetriadem praemisit*, but that solution is not altogether satisfactory; Villius has not been mentioned since the appointments for 192 (35.23.5).

Plutarch's source, evidently, this episode dramatized the failure of the "Flamininus Doctrine." A favorable treatment in the Polybian version is indicated in Zon. 9.19. In adjoining sections of Livy's narrative, Val. Ant. is challenged, 36.19 and 28, and Antias may be responsible for the version in *Flam.* 15.

⁵⁰ On the doublet, cf. Nissen *KU* 173–75. In 35.21 the Ligurian campaign is led by Minucius, whereas in 35.40.2–4 the same exploits are ascribed to L. Quinctius. The earlier source, in which L. Quinctius campaigned against the Boii (22.3f) is clearly linked to the account of Cato's censorship in 39.42–43 where Livy cites Cato's speech against L. Flamininus, and includes other details (43.5–44), from an annalistic source at odds with the Valerian version in Liv. 39.43. 1–3 (*Valerius Antias, ut qui nec orationem Catonis legisset, et fabulae tantum sine auctore credidisset...*) and Plut. *Flam.* 18–19; cf. Klotz, "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 52; see also the note following. I conclude that the earlier version of the campaign in question (35. 22.3–4) derives from Claudius Quadrigarius, and the later version (35. 40.3–4) from Valerius Antias. In the episode preceding (35.39) the intrusion of Villius is also a probable sign of Valerius Antias, who elsewhere gives special prominence to Villius; cf. note 6 above, and 35.14 with note 64 below.

Before the doublet in 40.2–4, it is more reasonable to assume that Livy joined together two versions of the last episode in *res Graeciae*, an annalistic version in which Villius took the initiative, and the Polybian version in which Flaminius was prominent.

Thus in the second panel of the pentad there are many indications that Livy has woven together partisan traditions in the *annales* with a more thorough and more credible account in Polybius, particularly in sections adjoining the pivotal events in the final chapters of books 34 and 35. It is sometimes supposed that Livy was influenced by the annalists in certain particulars, but the consistent characterization of Flaminius that emerges from the annalistic revisions has not been recognized. If we are to assess Livy's artistry and his debt to Polybius, this annalistic element must be taken into account.

Livy's chief annalistic source presented a view of Roman involvement in *res Graeciae* sharply at odds with Polybius. From the sequence of events in Plut. *Flam.* 12 and related sources it would appear that Livy has rearranged the episodes from Polybius, following a different chronology. That the *annales* preserved a widely divergent tradition for this section is proven by Livy's references at 33.30, and 34.41.8–10 and the annalistic doublet at 35.40: in Livy's record of the terms of the treaty of 196, Valerius Antias is explicitly cited for the more revisionist version of Roman policy; in the variant on the defeat of Nabis, the hand of Valerius Antias is, again, clearly indicated; and the doublet on the Gallic campaign of L. Quinctius, as I have argued, is almost certainly the work of Valerius. From these and other indications, the Valerian version of the "War against Nabis" can be reconstructed roughly as follows. The note that Nabis was defeated in pitched battle, rather than under siege (34.41.8–10), suggests that the entire sequence in Livy, in which Sparta was besieged and Argos liberated without a major battle, was lacking in the *annales*. It was probably Valerius, then, who reported the Second Declaration of Liberty, after a defeat of Nabis near Argos. It is more reasonable, after all, to assume that the celebration at Argos came soon after the city was liberated, in a scenario where the Romans were directly responsible for the Argives' deliverance (whereas in Livy's Polybian version, the Argives themselves liberated their city). In the Valerian scenario, the claim that the Aetolians plotted with Nabis against Rome dramatizes the theme of Aetolian treachery and tends to discredit Flaminius' doctrine of total withdrawal, where Polybius has expressed his admiration of the Roman's strategy and achievement.

The "Death of Hannibal" and "Intrigue with Demetrius"

Flaminius dramatically reappears in the closing panel of the fourth decade (39–40) after remaining all but absent from the intervening books, 36–38. Livy seems unwilling to give any but the most cursory treatment to the senatorial faction involving Flaminius in the 180s. It is evident that Flaminius played a much more prominent role in affairs at Rome in the Valerian version, while Livy says very little concerning the censorship of Flaminius and nothing at all

of the vendetta that erupted after Cato's impeachment of L. Flamininus.⁵¹ At the close of the decade of liberation, however, we find the Liberator once more involved in Machiavellian maneuvers to preserve the fragile spheres of influence that Rome had imposed upon the Greeks, in two episodes that are often cited as the clearest examples of Livy's revisionism, the "Death of Hannibal" and the "Intrigue with Demetrius."

Much of the interpretation of these episodes is based upon the radical *Quellenforschung* of the 1860s. For the "Death of Hannibal," Nissen (*KU* 229) supposed that Plut. *Flam.* 20 substantially represents the Polybian version, and he went so far as to suggest that we emend the text to acknowledge Plutarch's debt to Polybius.⁵² But Plutarch refers to many sources in this episode, and recent work on Plutarch's methods has given us a clearer idea of how he may have utilized such diverse material, drawing upon *hypomnemata*, often supplying context and quoting from memory.⁵³ Nissen's assumptions, therefore, regarding the discrepancies in Livy's account (39.51) should be reconsidered.

The events at Rome leading up to the episode in Plut. *Flam.* 20 derive from the Latin annalist: the censorship of Flamininus involved a divisive constitutional debate (not mentioned in Livy); and in the impeachment of Lucius Flamininus, Plutarch reports that Titus defended his brother in the assembly, afterward led reprisals in the Senate to invalidate Cato's *acta* as censor, and took legal action to impose a fine of 2 talents against Cato himself (*Cato* 19.2). This scenario and the moral judgment evoked against Titus' integrity probably derives from Valerius Antias: through loyalty to an unworthy kinsman, Flamininus opposed a magistrate in the lawful exercise of his authority (*Flam.* 19.3). On Cato's speech against Lucius, Livy acknowledges the divergent tradition in Valerius (39.43), but he suppresses Flamininus' campaign of retaliation, and portrays him in the image of those stoic heroes of the early republic, to whom duty was stronger than kinship.⁵⁴ In the Valerian version the

⁵¹ For Cato's speech against L. Flamininus, and other sources in this episode, see Nissen *KU* 226; Klotz, "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 51-52; H. Malcovati, *ORF* 4 (1976) frs. 69-71; and M. T. Sblendorio Cugusi's commentary, *M. Porci Catonis Orationum Reliquiae* (Torino 1982) 224-29. Full discussion of this episode and the rivalry of Cato and Flamininus is beyond the scope of this paper and will be taken up in a separate study, forthcoming in *CJ*.

⁵² For the view that Plut. *Flam.* 20 and App. *Syr.* 11 represent Polybius, see note 56.

⁵³ In Pelling's work (above, note 4) on the later Roman *Lives*, it is clear that, even where the "Pollio source" is of singular importance, contextual details from other sources were adapted from *hypomnemata* or added from memory.

⁵⁴ Liv. 39.42.7: *...retinere L. Quinctium in senatu ne frater quidem T. Quinctius, si tum censor esset, potuisset*. Livy suggests that Titus as censor (189) would have been so impressed by Cato's arguments and so compelled by his sense of duty that he would have condemned his own brother, despite his absolute authority to block any censure by a colleague, and even though the censor's powers were often wielded in prejudice; cf. Cic. *pro Cluentio* 43. 121-22; Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* 2.386-88; and Becker, in *Handbuch der Römischen Altertümer* 2.1 (Leipzig 1846) 211-12 and 224-26, "Es wird nicht selten

censure of Lucius Flamininus appears to mark the peripety in the career of Titus himself, much as the charges against L. Scipio lent *pathos* to the last years of Africanus. The censure of Lucius is followed closely, in both Plutarch and Livy, by the account of Hannibal's death, and the charge that Flamininus ordered his assassination.⁵⁵

There are three discrepancies regarding the motives and responsibility of Flamininus. In each case, by Nissen's assumption, Plutarch's version represents Polybius, and Livy's divergence is due to his own revisionism.⁵⁶ In Plutarch's account, Flamininus' motive in the death of Hannibal is native ambition, τὸ φύσει φιλότιμον, frustrated by exclusion from command as he grew older:

ἀπαλλαγεῖς δὲ τοῦ ἄρχεῖν καὶ πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἤλεγχετο
μᾶλλον, ἐν οὐκ ἔχοντι πράξεις ἔτι τῷ λοίπῳ βίῳ σπαργώντα

vorgekommen sein—und es fehlt auch nicht Beispielen—dass Privat- oder Parteienhass bei Ertheilung der nota mitgewirkt haben." The accounts in Plut. *Flam.* 18–19 and in Cic. *de Sen.* 42 make it clear that Flamininus shared in his brother's disgrace for failing to address the charges, and that Titus used every means to oppose Cato's inquisition.

⁵⁵ Cf. Plut. *Flam.* 20. 2–3 and Liv. 39. 51:

ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας οἴκοθεν μὲν ἐκ Καρχηδόνος ὑπεκδράς Ἀντιόχῳ συνῆν, ἐκείνου δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Φρυγίᾳ μάχην εἰρήνης ἀγαπητῶς τυχόντος, αὐθις φεύγων καὶ πλανηθεὶς... ἐν τῇ Βιθυνίᾳ κατέστη Προυσίαν θεραπεύων, οὐδένοιο Ῥωμαίων ἀγνοῶντος, ἀλλὰ παρορώντων ἀπάντων δι' ἀσθένειαν καὶ γῆρας... Τίτος δὲ πρεσβευτῆς δι' ἐτέρας δὴ τινας πράξεις... πρὸς τὸν Προυσίαν ἀφ' ἰκόμενος καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἰδὼν αὐτόθι διαιτώμενον, ἡγανάκτησεν εἰς ζῆλον, καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ Προυσίου δεομένου... ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ἱκέτου καὶ συνήθους οὐ παρήκε.

Ad Prusiam regem legatus T. Q. Flamininus venit, quem suspectum Romanis et receptus post fugam Antiochi Hannibal et bellum adversus Eumenem motum faciebat. Ibi seu quia a Flaminio inter cetera obiectum Prusiae erat hominem omnium, qui viverent, infestissimum populo Romano apud eum esse, qui patriae suae primum deinde opibus eius fractis Antiocho regi auctor belli adversus populum Romanum fuisset; seu quia ipse Prusias, ut gratificaretur praesenti Flaminio Romanisque, per se necandi aut tradendi eius in potestatem consilium cepit; a primo colloquio Flaminini milites extemplo ad domum Hannibalis custodiendam missi sunt.

⁵⁶ Nissen (*KU* 228–29) argued that the author cited for the third version of the death scene (whose name Stephanus emended from *ms* Λεύκιος to Λίβιος) should read Πολύβιος, and assumed that Plutarch thus acknowledges his chief source; followed by Klotz, in "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 52. But cf. Peter, (above, note 4) 84–85. with note; and Tränkle, against Nissen's assumption, *Livius und Polybios*, 153–55, and note 67. Nissen's emendation is paleographically implausible, and *ms* Λεύκιος is not an unintelligible reading; Plutarch ordinarily cites historical figures, once mentioned, by *praenomen* (historians, by *nomen* or *cognomen*), thus the reading could refer to L. Quinctius, just mentioned, or to L. Scipio, who took part in the embassy to Prusias, according to Valerius Antias *apud* Liv. 39.56.7 = *Flam.* 21.8. On the sources for this episode, see further notes 59–64 below.

πρὸς δόξαν καὶ νεανίζοντα τῷ πάθει κατέχειν ἑαυτὸν οὐ
δυνάμενος. (Flam. 20.1)

The downfall of elder statesmen through youthful ambition is a familiar theme, but it is irrelevant in this instance—in the year of Hannibal's death, Flamininus would have been no more than forty-five by Polybius' reckoning. The misplaced moral of the story probably derives from the Latin annalistic tradition.⁵⁷ In the episode that follows, some details undoubtedly derive from Polybius, but major discrepancies, on the purpose of the mission and direct responsibility for the fateful order, indicate conflation in both versions. Plutarch, however, leaves no question of Flamininus' guilt; in Livy's account, his culpability is left in doubt.

The crucial discrepancy concerns the official purpose of the embassy to Prusias, with whom Hannibal had taken refuge after the defeat of Antiochus. Nissen supposed that the Polybian version is indicated in Plutarch's explanation, Τίτος δὲ πρεσβευτὴς δι' ἐτέρας δὴ τινὰς πράξεις, κτλ. The damning implication that Flamininus decided the fate of Hannibal entirely without authorization is apparently found in App. Syr. 11 (πρεσβεύων ἐφ' ἑτέρα...οὔτε Ῥωμαίων ἐντειλαμένων...ἔκτεινε), and Nissen deduced a common source in Polybius. Appian, however, is at odds with Plutarch on at least two points (to be noted below), and Dio's account (Zon. 9.21) suggests that Plutarch and Appian both may have oversimplified the explanation in Polybius: envoys were sent to Prusias to discuss "other issues *and in particular the surrender of Hannibal*," δι' ἄλλα τέ τινα καὶ ὅπως καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐκδοίη.⁵⁸ Dio's version is consistent with Appian's paraphrase, if we assume in Polybius the envoys were sent to arrange the surrender of Hannibal and not for his execution (οὔτε Ῥωμαίων ἐντειλαμένων...ἔκτεινε). The demand for Hannibal's surrender, after all, was among the terms imposed upon Antiochus (Pol. 21.17; Liv. 37.45.16). It is clear that Hannibal was implicated in the hostilities between Prusias and Eumenes, and it is highly unlikely that Polybius denied Flamininus the authority to order Hannibal's arrest.⁵⁹ Appian says simply that

⁵⁷ Cf. Liv. 27.27.11, on the death of Marcellus in pursuit of Hannibal, *nec pro aetate...nec pro veteris prudentia ducis tam improvide*; and Plut. Marc. 28.3, φιλοτιμότερον πάθος ἢ κατὰ πρεσβυτήν τοσοῦτον. The sentiment appears to derive from Valerius: cf. Klotz in *RhM* 83 (1934) 315f; and, more recently E. Carawan in *CJ* 81 (1985) 140–41. For the age of Flamininus, cf. Pol. 18.12.5, "not yet 30" in the spring of 197. Of the Latin annalists, Valerius is cited by name four times in Plutarch, and a fifth time, perhaps, in *Flam.* 14, where Klotz would read τὸν Ἀντίαν for *ms.* Τουδιτανόν; cf. "Die Quellen Plutarchs" 47, and *WS* 24 (1902) 588. Claudius Quadrigarius is never cited, though Acilius is twice mentioned (below, note 64).

⁵⁸ The ἄλλα τε καὶ construction in Zon. 9.21 suggests a possible source of confusion in Plut. and App.: reference to other duties may have concealed the climactic importance of the last objective, "and especially for the surrender of Hannibal." Concerning other duties *en route* to Bithynia, Nissen (*KU* 227) refers to Pol. 23.5. Tränkle *Livius und Polybios* 154–55, rightly minimizes Livy's "patriotic alterations" in this episode.

⁵⁹ Cf. Justin 32.4.6–8: *Hannibal...auctor victoriae fuit....Quae ubi Romam*

“without authorization” Hannibal was put to death. We have only Plutarch’s word that Flaminius had no authorization for the arrest, and only Nissen’s inference that this was the account given in Polybius. Dio’s paraphrase is likely to be the more accurate version.

Livy’s account of motive and responsibility agrees with the tradition in Dio:

Ad Prusiam regem legatus T. Quinctius Flaminius venit, quem suspectum Romanis. et receptus post fugam Antiochi Hannibal et bellum adversus Eumenem motum faciebat. (39.51)

Livy implies that the Senate assigned Flaminius to deal specifically with the threat of Hannibal, and it was clearly the Senate’s intent not to allow their old adversary to remain active against Roman interests. Livy’s account agrees with the tradition in Plutarch on the escape attempt and the method of suicide, but in other important details it is clear that Livy adapted a second source. At the end of book 39 he acknowledges the variant:

Hannibalem hoc anno Antias Valerius decessisse est auctor legatis ad eam rem ad Prusiam missis praeter T. Quinctium Flaminiū, cuius in ea re celebre est nomen, L. Scipione Asiatico et P. Scipione Nasica.⁶⁰

In the Valerian version, Flaminius led a delegation of “eastern experts” with the express purpose of dealing with the threat of Hannibal. Nepos provides further details of this annalistic version (either directly from Valerius or from

nuntiata sunt, missi a senatu legati sunt, qui utrumque regem in pacem cogerent Hannibalemque poscerent. For a detailed account of the causes and chronology of the hostilities between Prusias and Eumenes, see C. Habicht in *Hermes* 84 (1956) esp. 90–100. Habicht notes that it is uncertain whether the extradition of Hannibal was expressly mentioned in Flaminius’ instructions, but he concludes: “Daß [Prusias] Hannibal bei sich aufnahm war ein unfreundlicher Akt gegenüber Rom; daß er ihn sogar im Kriege gegen Eumenes verwandte, mußte den Senat stärker ergrimmen, als daß er es überhaupt zum Kriege hatte kommen lassen” (100). That the Romans should delay 5 years before addressing the problem, Habicht explains by the threat of a “coalition of Rome’s enemies,” led by Hannibal, against Eumenes.

⁶⁰ Luce observed (*Livy*, 203) that the late notice at 56.7 came from *res Italiae*, and there is thus no reason to assume that he had not yet read Valerius for *res Graeciae*. Nissen supposed that Plutarch’s dramatic description of Prusias’ plea for the life of his comrade was the biographer’s own embellishment to play on the sympathies of his readers; Livy’s brief speech in *oratio obliqua* (cf. note 56), counting the offenses of Hannibal against the Roman people, was Livy’s own invention. It is also likely that these two details derive from paired speeches in a common source. Plutarch gives three versions of the method of suicide, and a shorter version of Hannibal’s dying words, which the editors, since Stephanus, assume to be a paraphrase of Livy (*ms* Λεύκιος), but which makes no mention of Livy’s *scelus Prusiae*. These and other discrepancies reveal that Plutarch was influenced by several sources on this notorious episode, certainly among them Valerius Antias, whose influence is evident preceding and following this episode; cf. Klotz “Die Quellen Plutarchs” 51–53.

Atticus, whom he cites *Han.* 13): Flaminius learned of Hannibal's presence at the court of Prusias, brought the matter before the Senate, and led the embassy to demand Hannibal's surrender.⁶¹ Plutarch also refers to this version :

καί φασιν ἔνιοι Τίτον οὐκ ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτα πράξαι,
πεμφθῆναι δὲ πρεσβευτὴν μετὰ Λευκίου Σκηπίωνος οὐδὲν
ἄλλο τῆς πρεσβείας ἐχούσης ἔργον ἢ τὸν Ἀννίβαν θάνατον.
(*Flam.* 21.8)

Plutarch concludes that the sole purpose of the embassy was to bring about the death of Hannibal, but, again, this is likely to be Plutarch's inference from Livy's phrase, *Hannibalem...decessisse legatis ad eam rem ad Prusiam missis*, and from the annalistic version of the Senate's denunciation (such as Nepos reports), that there could be no security so long as Hannibal was alive.⁶²

There is a twofold discrepancy concerning the question of who gave the order, and whether for arrest or execution. Plutarch leaves no doubt that Flaminius demanded Hannibal be put to death, though Prusias pleaded to save him; Appian implies that Prusias took part in the assassination (ἐκτείνε διὰ τοῦ Προσίου). Livy leaves both questions unanswered, whether Flaminius raised the issue (*seu quia a Flamini...obiectum Prusiae erat*), and intimidated Prusias with charges against "the greatest enemy of the Roman people," or Prusias decided on his own initiative (*seu quia ipse Prusias...consilium cepit*), either to kill Hannibal or arrest him (*per se necandi aut tradendi eius in potestatem*). Livy's *non liquet* clearly indicates that he met with conflicting sources.

The two versions of Hannibal's last words recall the noble conduct of the Romans toward Pyrrhus, when he was warned of assassination, but here, again, there is a discrepancy regarding the blame for Hannibal's death. In Plutarch, Flaminius is responsible, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ Τίτος ἀξιοζήλωτον ἀποίσεται νίκην. Livy's version also derives from an account in which Flaminius ordered execution, but apparently with Senate authorization and the complicity of

⁶¹ *Nep.Han.* 12:

Patres conscripti qui *Hannibale vivo* numquam se sine insidiis futuros existimarent, legatos in Bithyniam miserunt, in his Flaminiun, qui ab rege peterent ne *inimicissimum suum* secum haberet sibi que dederet.

(Cf. Liv. 39.51.2, *hominum omnium qui viverent, infestissimum populo Romano*). On the divergence between Valerius Antias and Polybius, especially regarding the synchronism of the deaths of Hannibal and Scipio (Liv. 39.52.1; *Nep. Han.* 13) see further F. Münzer, "Atticus als Geschichtschreiber," *Hermes* 40 (1905) 75–77. For further references suggesting popular fascination with the fate of Hannibal in Bithynia, cf. Varro fr. περὶ ἐξαγωγῆς, "*Romanis*," inquit, "*me Prusianes tradere volebat*"; Plin. *NH* 5.148.

⁶² For the suggestion that Plutarch took this reference to the Valerian version "at second hand" from Livy, cf. Nissen *KU* 291; and Peter (above, note 4) 84–85. Plutarch's knowledge of the Valerian version is not dependent on Livy's note, but his reference at 21.8, awkwardly joined to the debate on the guilt of Flaminius, may have been prompted by it.

Prusias:

Horum patres Pyrrho regi...ut a veneno caveret praedixerunt: hi legatum consularem, qui auctor esset Prusiae per scelus occidendi hospitis, miserunt. (39.51.11)⁶³

In view of this discrepancy, it is not likely that Plutarch's paraphrase derives from Livy, as editors assumed (above, note 60), but from a common source. The contrast of magnanimity and jealous ambition in Hannibal's last words, is also found in Plutarch's judgment against Flaminius and in a similar verdict by Appian, and in both of these later accounts this episode is paired with a scene that probably derives from the Roman tradition.

Both Plutarch and Appian here recall the meeting of Scipio and Hannibal at Ephesus. In Plutarch's account we are told that the report of Hannibal's death evoked recriminations against Flaminius in the Senate, where his eagerness to have the glory of Hannibal's death was considered all the more contemptible by comparison to the μεγαλοψυχία of Scipio (21.1–3). Appian also links the two episodes (*Syr.* 10–11) and the correspondence between his version of the meeting at Ephesus and Plutarch's led Nissen again to posit a common source in Polybius. Livy, however, reports the same meeting between Scipio and Hannibal, from "Claudius, who followed the Greek *libri* of Acilius" (35.14.5). Acilius, twice mentioned by Plutarch (*Cat. maj.* 22; *Rom.* 21), probably influenced his account of Hannibal's death and inspired his comment on the episode at Ephesus.⁶⁴

Nissen disregards the significant discrepancies between the versions of Appian and Plutarch, as well as Appian's indication that he is not following his chief source in this anecdote (λέγεται δέ...). In Appian's account of the meeting at Ephesus, it was Scipio's intent to discredit Hannibal with Antiochus, a very plausible motive, not mentioned by Plutarch (discounted by Livy). Moreover, Appian's report that Flaminius, by means of Prusias, put Hannibal to death without authorization is apparently at odds with Plutarch, who insists that Prusias pleaded to save him.

The popularity of these two episodes three centuries later should make us all the more wary of Nissen's assumption: in addition to the two versions of Hannibal's death in App. *Syr.* 11 and Plut. *Flam.* 20–1, Plutarch preferred another version in his lost *Scipio* (*Pyrrh.* 8). Yet another version of Hannibal's

⁶³ Cf. Val. Max. 9.2. ext.2: *illum...senatus...ad voluntariam mortem compulsi*.

⁶⁴ Nissen *KU* 168f; cf. G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*² (Turin and Florence 1964) 4.1. 252 note 44. The fragments of Acilius show a special interest in such examples of honorable conduct toward foes; cf. fr. 3, Cic. *de Off.* 3.32 113, against the Polybian tradition in Liv. 22.61.5. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* 154–55 note 67, concludes, from Livy's remark of the divergent tradition, 35.14.5, and from other references to the embassy of 193 where Scipio is not mentioned, that Livy found no mention of the meeting between Scipio and Hannibal in Polybius, nor is Polybius Plutarch's direct source. Tränkle notes E. Kümpe's suggestion, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte des Krieges der Römer gegen Antiochus III* (Hamburg 1893) 9–10., that we read Ἀκίλιος in the vexed passage at *Flam.* 20.9; cf. Petzold (above, note 10) 113.

death appears in Pausanias 8.11: Flamininus was expressly ordered to take him alive; Hannibal made his escape but died of an accidental wound. The popular fascination with the debate of history's greatest commanders—Alexander, Hannibal and Scipio—is evident in Lucian *Dial. Mort.* 12. It is likely that Appian followed a later, popular version of the Acilian tradition, while Plutarch had consulted Acilius directly in his preliminary research.

In the Valerian version, in which Flamininus led an embassy to Prusias for the express purpose of demanding Hannibal's surrender, there are also indications of senatorial opposition to Flamininus' mission, and recriminations afterward. It is in the context of such protest that Plutarch notes the Valerian version: those in the Senate who condemned Flamininus were answered by those who commended him; they argued that even in old age and in exile Hannibal still posed a threat to Rome (μία τοῦ μεταβάλλειν τελευτὴ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. διὸ καὶ φασιν ἔνιοι Τίτον οὐκ ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτα πράξαι, κτλ. 21.8 = Liv. 39.56.1; see above, note 62). The Valerian version in Nep. *Han.* 12.2 (above, note 61) clearly indicates that the Senate ordered Hannibal's extradition, despite Plutarch's inference that their sentence was death. All extant accounts except Appian and Pausanias agree that Hannibal took his own life. But if in the annalistic tradition, Flamininus was ordered to make the arrest and Hannibal then evaded arrest by suicide, Flamininus can hardly have been blamed or praised for his severity. Therefore the defense of Flamininus that Plutarch found in the Valerian version clearly implies that he was accused of exceeding his authority by ordering Hannibal's assassination.

Thus it appears that Livy had before him three distinct versions of these events, none entirely favorable to Flamininus. Plutarch's charge that Flamininus acted entirely without authorization is linked to Acilius, known to Livy through Claudius Quadrigarius. The claim that Flamininus was authorized to arrest "Rome's greatest enemy," but demanded execution, was probably found in Valerius Antias. It is likely that Livy's last version (39.51.3, *seu quia ipse Prusias, ut gratificaretur praesenti Flaminino*) represents Polybius: Prusias gave the order, to oblige his Roman overlord, and Flamininus approved his initiative, as he had condoned the murder of Brachyllas (Pol. 18.43).

The assassination of Demetrius comes as the final chapter in the decade of Liberation. This episode is often treated as a classic example of Livy's reliance on Polybius, although little of the Polybian version survives.⁶⁵ From the

⁶⁵ For Livy's handling of this episode, see esp. Nissen, *KU* 70, 234–5; Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* 81, 151–53. On the causes of the Third Macedonian War and the responsibility of Flamininus and Rome, see esp. C. F. Edson *HSCP* 46 (1935) 191–202, who assumes that Flamininus acted in accord with senatorial policy to put a Roman pretender on the throne of Macedon; F. W. Walbank, *Philip V* (Cambridge 1940) 244–52, who assumes, despite Livy's version of events, that there was a real conspiracy against the throne; P. Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris 1964) 123–39, on Polybius' causality and tragic history in this episode; and E. S. Gruen, "The Last Years of Philip V," *GRBS* 15 (1974) 221–46, and (with further bibliography) in *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley 1984) 399–419, in defense of Roman involvement. All assumed that Livy's account substantially represents Polybius.

fragments and independent testimonia that remain, it is clear that Livy, in a lengthy digression, has indeed adopted Polybius' arguments on the causes of the Third Macedonian War. Livy's digression (39.23.5–28.1) on the causes of the war shows a remarkable correspondence to Pol. 22.18, all the more noteworthy as it is awkwardly placed after the annalistic material for the close of 186, twelve years before the events that led to the war. Livy does not directly address the views that Polybius had disputed, that the "causes" of the war were the expulsion of Abrupolis, invasion of Dolopia, and the plot at Delphi against Eumenes, but later refers to these provocations in the speeches of Eumenes (42.13.5, following a reference to divergence in Val. Ant.), Marcius Philippus (42.40.5–8), and Perseus himself (42.41.10–42.5). At 39. 23.5–6, however, Livy appears to direct the argument against the erroneous views of his predecessors: "Cum Perseo rege et Macedonibus bellum quod imminabat, *non unde plerique opinantur*, nec ab ipso Perseo causas cepit: inchoata initia a Philippo sunt; et is ipse, si diutius vixisset, id bellum gessisse"; cf. 29.3: "Hae causae maxime animum Philippi alienaverunt ab Romanis, ut non a Perseo filio eius novis causis motum, sed ob has a patre bellum relictum filio videri possit."

In the succeeding chapters, however, there are indications that Livy has also adapted material in which the provocations and pretexts that led to war were given a different perspective. In Polybius, the final conflict with Macedon is rooted in the imperial ambitions of Philip himself and in his implacable hostility to Rome; Demetrius met his death as a casualty of this irrevocable will to war. Following Polybius, Livy insists that the causes of the war lay in Philip's discontent, not in Perseus' arrogance, nor implicitly in the downfall of Demetrius. But Livy also drew upon a tradition in which Flaminius' intrigue with Demetrius, and Philip's suspicion of a conspiracy against him, "sowed the seeds of the war to be waged with Perseus." In one tradition the assassination of Demetrius is an effect of causes already in motion; by the other view, the threat of a Roman conspiracy is the decisive provocation that alienated Philip and gave Perseus his pretext.⁶⁶ Conflation of these two interpretations appears to be the cause of inconsistencies in Livy's account and the discrepancies between Livy's version and the later Polybian tradition. Much of Livy's tragic history derives

⁶⁶ For the year 182, Livy seems convinced that the suspicion of a Roman conspiracy was a direct cause of the war with Perseus, *haec maxime vivo Philippo velut semina iacta sunt Macedonici belli, quod cum Perseo gerendum erat*. 40.16.3. This remark belongs to the annalistic tradition that Perseus was the instigator of the war, despite Philip's peaceful intentions, evident in the anecdote of Onesimus, 44.16.4–7, who advised Perseus to follow Philip's custom of twice daily reading the treaty with Rome. The picture of Philip as "ein Friedensfreund" is, of course, preposterous, and Nissen (*KU* 292) supposed that the anecdote was misconstrued by Livy or his annalistic source. Pédech (above, note 65) 133, suggests that Polybius reported the anecdote as proof of Philip's implacable resentment of Roman domination; he wrongly assumes from the reference to Claudius Quadrigarius in 44.15.1 that the anecdote in Livy derives from Claudius. As Nissen observed, the intervening annalistic material (introduced by *alii...tradunt*) probably belongs to Valerius Antias, certainly not to Claudius.

not from Polybius but from a tradition that Polybius disputes.⁶⁷ In that tragical tradition, it is likely that one of the principal dramatic devices in Livy's scenario, the second letter—forged with Flamininus' signature—was invented by one of Livy's Latin predecessors.

The first letter, which encouraged suspicions against Demetrius, receives a brief reference in Polybius. In Livy's account it is adapted by the familiar technique of transposition that often indicates conflicting sources. Polybius reports that Flamininus, in secret negotiations, had promised Roman support for Demetrius' succession (Pol. 23.3.7).⁶⁸ Livy transposes this claim into the allegations of Demetrius' opponents: *Romanos Demetrium in paterno solio locaturos...haec vulgo loquebatur* (Liv. 39.53.4). Polybius further reports that a letter of Flamininus to Philip, calling for continued negotiations through Demetrius, contributed to the resentment against him and *provided the pretext for the assassination*: ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος ὁ Περσεύς μετ' ὀλίγον ἔπεισε τὸν πατέρα συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ Δημετρίῳ θανάτῳ. (23.3.8–9). Livy makes no mention of this letter in the narrative, but only in the accusations of Perseus (40.11.1–2), "*Quo spectare illas litteras ad te nunc missas T. Quinctii credis...T. Quinctius nunc est auctor omnium rerum isti et magister.*" In Livy's account, it is a consequence of this debate at Pella, on charges that Demetrius plotted to murder his rival, that "the seeds of war were

⁶⁷ Pol. 23.10–13, because of such expressions as δίκην ἢ τύχην βουλομένη λαβεῖν and τότε παρέστησέ τινας ἐρινύς καὶ ποινὰς καὶ προστροπαίους, is often thought to reveal the sensationalism of tragic history: cf. Walbank in *JHS* 58 (1938) 55–68; Pédech, *La Méthode historique* (above, note 65) 126–28; also Gruen, "The Last Years" (above, note 65) 223. It is likely, however, that Polybius meant to cast suspicion upon dramatic embellishments to the story, such as Philip's quoting Stasinus (ὡς φασι, 23.10.10); he condemns just such tragic motifs in Phylarchus (2.56.10). Polybius consistently introduces such statements by καθάπερ ἂν εἰ, ὥσανεῖ, and the like. The role of Τύχη is best understood as a rhetorical construct based on popular usage (cf. *De Sanctis Studia dei Romani*² 3.1.209–11). In this particular instance, the Erinyes and προστρόπαιοι are not part of the historian's explanation, but are conjured in the mind of Philip (cf. 23.10.14).

⁶⁸ Pol. 23.3.7:

ὁ τε Τίτος ἐκκαλεσάμενος τὸ μειράκιον καὶ προβιβάσας εἰς λόγους ἀπορρήτους, οὐκ ὀλίγα συνέβαλετο πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. τὸν τε γὰρ νεανίσκον ἐψυχαγόγησεν, ὥς αὐτίκα μάλα συγκατασκευασόντων αὐτῷ Ῥωμαίων τὴν βασιλείαν.

On Flamininus' patronage of Demetrias, cf. App. *Mac.* 9.6, Φλαμίνινου δὲ αὐτὸν τῇ βουλῇ γνωρίζοντος ἰσχυρῶς; and, on the allegations of Perseus, Zon. 9.22 (*init.*) Περσεύς...καὶ διέβαλεν αὐτὸν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντα τῷ πατρί; Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 8.5, ἐκ διαβολῆς. Though much of the debate between Perseus and Demetrius in Polybius is lost, the speech of Philip, rebuking his sons for their rivalry (Pol. 23.11 = Liv. 40.8), shows that Livy has elaborated the scene at greater length than his predecessor, with "patriotic alterations": among the exemplars of fraternal concord whom Philip commends, Livy names T. and L. Flamininus.

sown."⁶⁹

To investigate the allegations against Demetrius, Philip sent ambassadors to Rome: *...erant autem et hi Persei fraudis ministri* (40.20.3). These *legati* returned with a second letter from Flamininus, *falsas etiam litteras signo adulterino T. Quinctii signatas* (23.7). Livy insists that the letter was a forgery (cf. 24.1; 55.1). Modern commentators, on the contrary, have been inclined to consider it an authentic communiqué from Flamininus, and to suppose that it was reported as genuine in Polybius.⁷⁰ The report of the second letter in Livy, however, does not appear to be integral to the Polybian material: it was reported after Didas had betrayed Demetrius' plan of escape and his accomplice Herodorus had been arrested; it would appear that his guilt was already decided. But Livy insists that it is the second letter that sealed the doom of Demetrius (*Hae litterae fidem Persei criminibus fecerunt*, 23.9; *...maxime falsae litterae T. Quinctii urgebant*, 24.1). The incriminating letter at this point seems superfluous. Its significance, that "the letter gave credence to Perseus' accusations" and "weighed decisively" in Philip's judgment, seems to convey the sense of Polybius' comment on the first letter: with this basis for his accusations (ταῦταίς ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος) "Perseus soon persuaded his father to arrange the death of Demetrius."

The content of the second letter itself indicates a source other than Polybius. Flamininus warned Philip of Demetrius' designs on the throne and expressly disavowed complicity:

Deprecatio in litteris erat si quid adulescens cupiditate regni
prolapsus secum egisset: nihil eum adversus suorum quemquam

⁶⁹ Pédech, (above, note 65) 128, insists that Livy's conclusion, 40.16.3, *semina iacta ...belli, quod cum Perseo gerendum*, recalls Polybius' argument on causes; on the contrary, this comment refers specifically to the debate at Pella and the charges that Demetrius plotted to assassinate his rival, and thus it is not altogether consistent with the Polybian thesis.

⁷⁰ In the second letter, Walbank, *Philip V* (above, note 65) 251, concluded:

The likeliest explanation is that Polybius was here employing unreliable evidence, probably of Achaean origin, and that Flamininus letter, though genuine, was couched in much more guarded terms than our source suggests.

Briscoe (above, note 2) 25, also believes that the letter was reported as authentic in Polybius; cf. Gruen, "The Last Years" (above, note 65) 243–45. Pédech, (above, note 65) 130, argues that had Flamininus been guilty of such a "maladresse criminelle," his enemies, Cato chief among them would have known and would have made it known. G. Brizzi, *I sistemi informativi dei Romani*, *Historia Einzelschr.* 39 [1982]), in the most recent discussion of the second letter, constructs an elaborate scenario (213–14) to test Walbank's hypothesis, only to conclude, with Pédech, that for Flamininus to have drafted such a letter, presumably not without consulting his most trusted advisers (if not the full Senate), more than criminal negligence, would have involved "collective stupidity." Brizzi rightly observes that the first letter would have proven provocative enough, contributing to Philip's fears of tribal unrest in the borderlands and faction within the ruling hierarchy.

facturum neque eum se esse qui ullius impii consilii auctor futurus videri possit. (40.23.8)

The profusion of pronouns suggests that Livy has paraphrased a document given in *oratio recta* in his source; it is inherently unlikely that this document was part of the same account in which, shortly before, Flamininus had recommended the loyal services of Demetrius (Pol. 23.3). That Flamininus' warnings, contradicting his earlier letter of commendation, would be so readily accepted, so soon after Perseus' charges regarding the first letter and without comment on the contradiction, tends to confirm the suspicion that the two letters derive from two different sources. The second letter appears to belong to the same tradition that suggested Livy's revision in Philip's speech (cf. Pol. 23. 11; Liv. 40.8), praising Flamininus. Thus, it is likely that the second letter is a fabrication, not of Perseus' "agents of deception," but of the same tradition that portrayed Philip as a peaceable adherent to the terms Flamininus dictated (cf. note 66).

Nowhere in the later "Polybian tradition" is there any hint of the forged letter. Diodorus' reference to "those who fabricated false accusations" (29.25) is a surprisingly vague paraphrase, if the forged letter of Flamininus was as crucial in Polybius as it is in Livy. Justin's epitome of Trogus suggests that Perseus' trumped-up charge of a conspiracy to assassinate him (32.2.9, *insidias sibi ab eo paratas confingit*) was the chief indictment, whereas Livy insists that Philip was unimpressed by these charges (40.16.3, *crimen facile revictum*, cf. Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 8.5; Zon. 9.22.1). Moreover, in the aftermath of the assassination, Livy notes two versions of the fate that awaited the agents of Demetrius' doom (40.55.7). It is, of course, possible that both versions were given by Polybius, and that the note in Diodorus is a simplification of his account; but it is far more likely that Livy was influenced by a second version, at odds with Polybius.⁷¹ The second letter in Livy's account is likely to be a doublet derived from just such an annalistic tradition.

The position of this sequence at the close of the decade, leading to the conflict to come, and the extent to which Livy has developed it, beginning in book 39 and covering the better half of book 40, argue strongly that the author consulted and adapted the most notable discussions relevant, to give the fullest if not the most convincing account. We should be wary, therefore, of the traditional view that Livy owes the sequence of action to Polybius, and the patriotic editing and emphasis are due to his own revisionism. Without further

⁷¹ Diodorus reports, οἱ μὲν ἐκ Ῥώμης τὰς ψευδεῖς διαβολὰς πλασάμενοι μετ' ὀλίγον χρόνον... ἀνηρέθησαν (29.25). Livy gives a different account of those responsible for the false charges, Apelles and Philocles, *qui Romam legati fuerant litterasque exitiales Demetrio sub nomine Flaminini attulerant* (40.54.9). Their guilt was proven by the confession of their accomplice Xychus, *falsas esse et a scriba vitiatas signumque adulterinum...ordinemque omnem facinoris legatorum ministerique sui exposuit* (55.1–5). By one account (40.55.6) Apelles found refuge in Italy, which seems unlikely if it was known to have framed Demetrius; by another report (42.5.4), he was recalled to Macedon and executed. On the fate of Philocles, Livy mentions two versions, that he confessed when he heard the testimony of Xychus, and that he denied the charges under torture.

testimony it is only conjecture, but it is at least as plausible an hypothesis that Valerius (who is four times cited for significant variants in the adjoining narrative, 39.22.8; 41.5; 43.1; 56.7) reported the letter of Flamininus out of sequence, in closer connection with the assassination, to give greater irony and pathos to the fall of Demetrius and the failure of the Liberation. Livy, in his eagerness to amplify the pivotal event, attempted to reconcile the partisan *annales* and Polybius.

Conclusion

It is often urged that Livy's methods are not to be judged by the same standards nor his aims understood on the same assumptions that guide modern historians. He is, first of all, a moralistic historian; as he tells us in the preface (9), his chief concern is the character of the men that built the empire. His preoccupation with the *personae* of the historical drama is evident in the greater structure of his work, as it is in the role of Flamininus in the fourth decade.⁷² We should not, however, neglect an important motive of the ancient historian in which he is much like his modern counterpart: his work is, to a great degree, a response to the work of his predecessors. In the first and last panels of the decade, the characterization of Flamininus appears at the focus of Livy's revision and rebuttal. The prevailing pattern of Livy's editorial changes suggests that he was primarily concerned to answer his Roman *Vorgänger*, not simply to idealize the "sinister" figure he found in Polybius. Claudius Quadrigarius is occasionally cited for minor discrepancies and moralistic *exempla*, but foremost among the works of his compatriots, whose findings Livy most often disputes, were the *annales* of Valerius Antias.⁷³

The influence of Valerius is clearly indicated in the arrangement of the campaigns against Philip and Nabis, and in the final chapters of Flamininus' career. As Livy went about the organization and adaptation of his material, he adopted much of his moral emphasis in response to Valerius, if not in agreement with him. In coordinating Polybius with the annalistic framework, Livy was guided more by architectonic principle than by concern for historical accuracy: thus he rearranged the sequence of episodes in the campaign of 198–97 to achieve a clearer reversal of the action, from the frustration of the first year to the unbroken successes of the second.

To reconcile conflicting traditions, Livy sometimes transposes an earlier author's comments into the speech of his characters. The most famous example of this technique is found in Polybius' praise of Flamininus at the Isthmus, which Livy, with apparent irony, attributes to the jubilant Greeks. Livy also

⁷² A "biographical" principle is evident in recent outlines of the structure of Livy's history: see esp. Philip Stadter in *Historia* 21 (1972) 287–307; and G. Wille, *Der Aufbau des livianischen Geschichtswerks* (Amsterdam 1973).

⁷³ Val. Ant. is cited 19 times in the fourth decade, often in regard to Flamininus or Scipio; Claudius is cited 6 times, never with such critical comment as Livy reserves for Val. Ant. at 33.10.8–9 and 39.43.1. Against Edson's view that Polybius portrayed a "sinister" Flamininus, cf. Gruen, "The Last Years," (above, note 65) 236 note 49.

recasts Polybius' comment on Flamininus' treatment of the Aetolians into the complaint of the Aetolians themselves; the charge that Flamininus was accomplice to the murder of Brachyllas is voiced by the Boeotians; and in the allegations of Perseus, Livy transposes the claim of Polybius, that Flamininus promised Demetrius the throne. These revisions appear to be prompted by Roman *Fides*-propaganda, and they are clearly "patriotic alterations" to absolve the Roman side from blame for the wars with Antiochus and Perseus, but these changes are not entirely favorable to Flamininus. Livy's figure is not the master of strategy and diplomacy that Polybius portrays. In his characterization, Livy evidently responded to an annalistic tradition in which the treachery of the allies and the failed policy of Flamininus brought on the wars that followed the Liberation.

This annalistic tradition is directly linked to the *Annales* of Valerius Antias by references at 32.6.5–8, where we are told that the first victory against Philip was reported for Flamininus' predecessor Villius; at 33.30.6–11, where Valerius is cited for the most extravagant terms of the treaty of 196; and at 34.41.8–9, Livy notes a divergent tradition, in which the Aetolians plotted with Nabis to join battle near Argos, which, I have argued, probably derives from Valerius. The first of these references reveals the Valerian chronology for 198–97, which is also indicated in *res Romae* at 32.28.5, and in the order of events at Opus, Nicaea and Thebes; and in connection with the negotiations of 198–97, Valerius is the probable author of the special imperium granted Flamininus in the annalistic tradition, *Quinctio liberum arbitrium pacis ac belli* (32.28.9; 37.5). Valerius is also cited for exaggerated casualties at Kynoskephalai, *si Valerio qui credat* (33.10). To Livy's credit, he did not often indulge the earlier annalist's *Fabulierlust*, but he was probably influenced by Valerius to attribute Flamininus' success to the workings of unforeseen fortune, in preference to the Machiavellian *πρόνοια* of the Polybian character.

In the later career, the hand of Claudius is evident in Livy's account of the censorship of Cato and the charges against L. Flamininus. In Claudius, Cato appears to discredit his rival. The most damning account of Flamininus' role in the death of Hannibal probably derives from Acilius, and was known to Livy through Claudius. Valerius is cited for the popular version of charges against L. Flamininus, at odds with Cato's speech (39.42–3), and Valerius is a probable source for the vendetta against Cato in Plut. *Flam.* 19. The same annalist is cited a few chapters later in Livy for a divergent tradition on the "Death of Hannibal". Finally, in an annalistic tradition at odds with Polybius, the "Intrigue with Demetrius" probably formed a companion piece to the "Death of Hannibal": the arrogance of Flamininus as arbiter of Greek affairs led ironically to the downfall of his protégé and the failure of the Liberation.

Livy recognizes the merit of Polybius as a superior authority at the end of the third decade, *haudquaquam spernendus auctor*, and at the pivot of the seventh pentad, *non incertum auctorem*. He relies upon Polybius in disputing much that he regarded as fiction or slander in his Latin sources, but he appears to be wary of the Greek historian's admiration for the Liberator; and he does not altogether abandon the *annales*, where the failure of Roman policy was linked to the arrogance of Flamininus and his misguided confidence in an *infida societas*. The

annalistic interpretation is sometimes found in Livy's own account, as in the fictitious terms of 196, "Philip must wage no foreign war without consent of the Senate" (33.30.6), and the tale that Philip, like a loyal ally, "twice read over the treaty every day" (44.16.4–5). Such propaganda suppresses a cause of opposition to Roman hegemony, the conciliation of tyrants. On the other hand, Livy ignored the tradition that "the fetters of Greece" were freed at the Isthmus (*Flam.* 10), and he would not take the word of Valerius that extravagant concessions were made to Athens and Rhodes (33.30.11); these were inventions clearly intended to silence the protest *vana species libertatis*. Dismissing allied grievances, the *annales* put upon Flamininus much of the blame for Greek betrayal. Livy was prompted by Polybius to question these partisan traditions, and to balance the account of the Liberator who led Rome deeper into involvement in the East.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ A special note of thanks is due to those who refereed this paper for *TAPA*, for their meticulous and highly constructive reviews; and to my most tireless critic, Alison Parker.